PALESTINE.

DISTURBANCES IN MAY, 1921.

Reports of the Commission of Inquiry

WITH

Correspondence Relating Thereto.

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, October, 1921.

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PALESTINE.

DISTURBANCES IN MAY, 1921.

Reports of the Commission of Inquiry with Correspondence relating thereto.

No. 1.

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

A.

I appoint His Honour Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine, Mr. H. C. Luke, Assistant Governor of Jerusalem, and Mr. Stubbs, of the Legal Department, to be a Commission to inquire into the recent disturbances in the town and neighbourhood of Jaffa, and to report thereon.

And I appoint Sir Thomas Haycraft to be the Chairman, and Aref Pasha Dejani El Daoudi, Elias Eff. Mushabbeck and Dr. Eliash to be assessors to the Commission.

The Commission shall have all the powers specified in Article 2 of the Commission of Inquiries Ordinance, 1921.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner for Palestine.

7th May, 1921.
B.

I DIRECT the Commission of Inquiry, appointed by Order dated the 7th of May to inquire into and report upon the recent disturbances in the town and neighbourhood of Jaffa, to extend their inquiries and report further upon recent disturbances which have taken place in any part of the District of Jaffa or elsewhere in Palestine.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner for Palestine.

23rd May, 1921.
No. 2.

Interim Report by the Commission of Inquiry on the Khedera Raid, 6th May, 1921.

While the Commission was sitting at Jaffa taking evidence about the Jaffa riots, the Chairman received an instruction from His Excellency the High Commissioner, that it was desired to have an interim report on the Khedera raid as soon as possible. The Commission accordingly removed to Nablus on the 13th June, and sat during three days at Khedera, and six days at Tulkeram. The three Assessors representing the Moslem, Christian and Jewish Communities, accompanied it.

Khedera is a Jewish agricultural colony with its village situated on a rising ground, isolated in a sandy but generally cultivated plain of Philistia, about 2½ miles from the sea, between Jaffa and Cæsarea; the village is well built with houses of European type and streets of soft sand, the whole girdled and interspersed with eucalyptus trees. It is a pleasant place, and the colonists give one the impression of being of a sturdy and healthy type. They look what they are, an agricultural community, and they have built up a prosperous little commonwealth by their own persistent industry. Their number is about 600 souls, and they employed, until the recent disturbance, about 400 to 500 Arab labourers, who belonged to the surrounding villages, and generally resided in the colony, except for periodical visits to their villages.

The nearest administrative centre is Tulkeram, about 12 miles distant, in the administrative district of Jaffa, while Khedera is in that of Haifa. There is a railway station on the Haifa-Ludd line, about 1½ miles from the village. Kakon is about seven and Tulkeram about 12 miles to the south-east. Kakon is just on the edge of the sandy plain, and is a link between that part of the plain and a number of villages to the east and north-east. Tulkeram is on the high road from Jaffa to Nablus, with Jaffa about 27 miles to the south-west, and Nablus about 18 miles to the east.

You may call Tulkeram a large village or a small town. It is the administrative centre for about 40 villages and is the seat of a Sub-District Governor. It is almost exclusively Moslem; there are a few Christians, but Jews are not tolerated. The same may be said of Nablus, the capital of the district of Samaria.

On the 6th May, 1921, a raid was made from neighbouring villages upon Khedera. The lives of the colonists were saved by the arrival of an aeroplane, but two houses were burned and 14 houses were wholly or partially ransacked. Much cattle is said to have been stolen.

The events which led up to this raid began with the Jaffa riots, which took place on the 1st May. The consequent excitement spread through the country, especially to the north-east. No open hostility had existed in the past between Moslems and Jews, between Tulkeram
and its neighbourhood and Khedera, but there had been little intercourse and little opportunity for quarrel.

The facts of the Jaffa riots were greatly exaggerated, and there were stories of Moslems—men, women and children—having been murdered by Jews. The Jews were supposed to be generally Bolshevik, and Bolsheviks were understood to be against property and Government, marriage and religion. There were rumours that rifles and ammunition had been sent from Khedera to Petach-Tikvah (Mulebbis) and Jaffa to arm the Jews, and that the Arab workmen of Khedera had been imprisoned in the colony.

Mr. Reading, the Sub-District Governor of Tulkeram, was absent on leave, and Wadi Effendi Isawi, a Palestinian Christian official, was acting in his place. He admits that he was quite aware on Wednesday, the 4th May, that there was a movement in Tulkeram and neighbourhood against the Jews. This movement first concentrated in an advance towards Khedera, and some 100 men marched out of Tulkeram at about 7.30 in the evening. The Acting Sub-District Governor telephoned to the Civil Secretary, who gave him leave to use some Indian Cavalry, who were at Tulkeram on their way elsewhere. With these he proceeded on the night of the 4th to Kakon, and succeeded in turning back the crowd, but there is little doubt that he would not have succeeded in doing this but for the Cavalry, because the Arabs were persuaded that Arab workmen had been imprisoned in Khedera. So persistent was this rumour from that time onwards, that on the following day an excited crowd was rushing to the armoury clamouring for arms, and was with difficulty kept back. It was calmed for the moment by the Acting Sub-District Governor, who then telephoned to the Civil Secretary, and obtained the services of an aeroplane to drop a letter in the colony. The following is the text of the letter:

"You are warned to let all Arab workmen in the colony of Khedera go this evening at six o'clock, otherwise the Arabs of neighbouring villages are likely to attack you in order to release them, as they believe the workmen are being detained against their will."

The sense of this message was made known to the people of Tulkeram in a reassuring communique by the Acting Sub-District Governor, who also endeavoured to obtain reinforcements of police or troops from the Civil Secretary, and the District Governors of Jaffa and Nablus. As the result of these representations British Reserve Inspector Beard arrived from Nablus with 10 policemen. This took place on Thursday, 5th May, on which day there was an attack by Arabs on Petach-Tikvah (Mulebbis), a Jewish colony about 18 miles south-west of Tulkeram and eight miles from Jaffa, but east of the high road. Many Arabs were killed by the military. The village of Kalkileh, about 10 miles south-west of Tulkeram, and in its jurisdiction, and about eight miles from Petach-Tikvah, became the centre of a fresh set of rumours, which accused the inhabitants of Petach-Tikvah of attacking Arab villages, particularly Kalkileh. This rumour was so persistent that even as far distant as Tulkeram families were leaving their villages for fear of the Petach-Tikvah Jews. At the same time the story of arms being
sent to Petach-Tikvah by cart was revived, and on the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th, a crowd of some hundreds descended on Tulkeram railway station. Mr. Garnett was there in charge of telephone construction, and had already sent away his Jewish workmen for safety—only just in time, as it transpired, since the crowd that came to the station made at once for the tents of the Jewish workmen with intent to kill them. This crowd did no damage of any kind, nor did it interfere with the railway officials, or with Mr. Garnett. It had two objects in view—firstly, to get into a goods train going to Kalkilieh and to defend the village against the Jews; secondly, to search for the carts supposed to be carrying arms to Petach-Tikvah. Mr. Garnett stopped the goods train, and part of the crowd dispersed. When a passenger train came in from Kalkilieh the remainder searched it for Jews, but could not find any. It is curious that it did not then occur to it to enter the train and proceed to Khedera.

During the whole of the afternoon of the 5th May there was great excitement in Tulkeram, and Wadi Effendi had no respite from deputations and demonstrations. At this time, Nablus, too, was in a high state of excitement over the Jaffa riots, and refused to believe any official reports and pronouncements. Colonel Postlethwaite, the Governor, had to request notables to come from Jaffa and make a report in person in order to quieten the townspeople. At about 6 p.m. on the 5th a motor car containing Omar Effendi Bittar and Mr. Tadros, leading Moslem and Christian notables of Jaffa, passed through Tulkeram on its way to Nablus. The crowds at Tulkeram, not knowing the identity of the occupants of the car, and prompted by an idea that they were sent by the Jews, assumed a hostile attitude, and it was only with an escort of police that the car was able to proceed on its way, after these gentlemen had attempted to reassure the mob. Later on a fresh commotion arose owing to the rumour of an attack upon Kalkilieh by Jews. This rumour was greatly strengthened by a telephone message from the stationmaster, Kalkilieh, to Wadi Effendi, in which he transmitted a report that a strong Jewish force had sacked Kalkilieh, whose inhabitants were fleeing to the hills. This report also became known in the town. Wadi Effendi after vainly attempting to dispel the rumour, communicated with the Civil Secretary, who informed him that relief was being sent and that armoured cars would soon leave for Khedera. It seems as if at the moment, although the most persistent and exciting rumours still dealt with Kalkilieh, it did appear to the Acting Sub-District Governor that Khedera, which was the nearest Jewish colony, was the chief point of danger in his vicinity. Had he been better acquainted with the country, which was, of course, outside his district, he would have known that armoured cars were the least useful military weapon in such sandy and trackless soil, and would have pressed for cavalry.

During the night of the 5th and the early morning of the 6th, people were coming in from neighbouring villages, and a considerable number must have collected in Tulkeram. They were rudely armed, and not a serious force if encountered by a small number of experienced troops; but a formidable mob for the police to deal with. They were
too excited to listen to reason. Such alarm had been caused by the Kalkilieh reports that women and children had been sent to Nablus for safety. Wadi Effendi himself went to Kalkilieh on the early morning of the 6th. An armoured car and two tenders under the control of Lieutenant Buttersley had arrived at Tulkeram at 6 a.m. on the 6th, and were stationed at the open place opposite the Governorate.

All was quiet at Kalkilieh when the Acting Sub-District Governor arrived; nothing had happened there except that shots had been heard from a village in the direction of Petah-Tikvah, provoking a certain amount of panic. On his return to Tulkeram he found two questions awaiting him—a deputation from Nablus asking for information about Kalkilieh, and insisting on the disarming of the Jews; secondly, the outstanding question of Khedera. He asked the Nablus deputation if they would like to send a member with him to Khedera to inquire as to the truth of the rumour about the imprisoned workmen. This offer they declined.

At this time Wadi Effendi did not seem to have realised that anything very serious was happening in the direction of Khedera. The night before he, with the help of the Mayor, had got a certain amount of the crowd out of Tulkeram, under the impression that if this were done they would disperse to their villages. Whether these men, or any of them, afterwards went to Khedera, we do not know. Mr. Beard, Reserve Inspector of Police at Nablus, had taken charge of the police at Tulkeram at about 8.15 in the morning of the Thursday. He seems to have realised the importance of the situation on the Thursday, because on that evening he communicated with the Civil Secretary, asking for cavalry, and was promised reinforcements, but no cavalry specifically. He says nothing about the crowd having been kept out of the town on Thursday night, but tells what certainly did happen, namely, that a crowd set out from Tulkeram in the direction of Kakon at about 9 o'clock on Friday morning, and could not be held back. He sent five mounted men, in charge of Sergeant-Major Inam, to turn them if possible. Copies of Wadi Effendi's reassuring communiqué were given to the police for distribution among the crowd. When they reached Kakon the Sergeant-Major sent a man to say that a large and excited mob had collected at Kakon, and that Mr. Beard should either come himself or send more men. The police at Tulkeram had then been increased to the number of 15 by the reinforcements sent from Nablus. Five of these had already, as we have seen, gone with the Sergeant-Major, and Mr. Beard sent five more. He ought to have known at that time that an attack on Khedera was imminent, and that the presence of a superior officer was imperative. It was not enough to have sent 10 police under a N.C.O. to keep back a large mob evidently bent on mischief, who, for all he knew, might number some thousands. The only chance he had of doing anything effective was to ride out himself, push on his police to the colony, and defend it as best he could, as Theodore Effendi Aboud, the Palestinian Inspector in charge of the Tulkeram Police, who was present at the time, could well have been entrusted with the maintenance of public security in the town. While
we would hesitate to assert that this course would in the event have saved the colony, we think that he should have tried it. The armoured cars were then waiting to be used. They might have been of some use if sent to Khedera in good time, so as to provide machine guns for the defence.

Mr. Beard did nothing but send five policemen to join the others in the futile attempt to keep back the crowd. They did no good and no harm.

When Wadi Effendi had returned from Kalkilieh he was again in telephonic communication with the Civil Secretary, and it was decided that he should take two notables and the Mayor to Khedera to inquire into the allegations about the workmen. There was a good deal of discussion about it, the crowd objecting to their Mayor and notables taking any risk. Finally it was decided that Wadi Effendi should take the son of the Mayor and two other sons of notables in a Ford car, which was escorted by an armoured car and a tender, under the command of 2nd-Lieutenant McDonald, with four police in addition to the military complement. It was not a brilliant enterprise. The armoured car and tender stuck in the sand, and only reached the colony after about 2½ hours, and the Ford car with Wadi Effendi and the young notables never arrived at all, Mr. McDonald having left it behind a mile or so outside Khedera, as the attack was in progress and the occupants were unarmed.

Now we come to what had happened in the colony during the time that Tulkeram had been the centre of agitation. Khedera is extraordinarily isolated from Tulkeram, and only vague, sandy tracks connect the two places. It is quicker to go on horseback. It was not in the district of Wadi Effendi, and he had never been there. The Senior District Official in the locality at the time was Mr. Andrews, an inspector attached to the Governorate, Haifa. On Thursday, the 5th, Mr. Andrews was at another Jewish Colony further north, arranging for its defence, and fully aware that an attack upon the Jews was likely to occur at any moment. By 7 a.m. on Friday, the 6th, he was in Khedera. The Arab labourers had been dismissed the day before and the colonists had concentrated upon the yard and house of Mr. Schneirson, in the north-west portion of the village. Mr. Andrews went to the station for the purpose of telephoning, and got into communication with Haifa, asking for a dozen troops by rail, also with Divisional Headquarters at Ludd, asking for an aeroplane. The Indian troops sent from Haifa could not have arrived in time, even if nothing had occurred to delay them. They were delayed for an hour at Kafr Samir, owing probably to the indifference and stupidity of a railway official, Naim Effendi El Khoury, who was accompanying the train. What prevented the raid from being converted into a catastrophe was the arrival of the aeroplane.

At 10 a.m. Flying Officer Flynn, R.A.F., received orders from his Commanding Officer to go to Khedera and reconnoitre raiding Arabs in that district, "offensive action not to be taken unless necessary." He left Ramleh at 10.20 a.m., and was over Khedera at 10.55 a.m. He saw about 500 Arabs at a distance which he took to be 3½ miles
from the colony. They appeared to be in an attacking formation on a front of about two miles. The aviator dropped bombs clear of the Arabs, and fired his machine gun to frighten them, and it had the effect of making them rush to a Bedouin Camp to the south of the colony. Then he flew to Jenin for further orders. He could not remain in the air until the Arabs actually attacked, and until his petrol was exhausted. He hesitated to use force because an attack had not actually begun. He proceeded to Jenin for more definite orders, and from that station sent a message to Ramleh for a second aeroplane. When the airman returned at 12.35 p.m. the attackers had already entered the village from the south-east under the cover of a grove of eucalyptus trees. They had burned, ransacked, destroyed and looted at will in that quarter of the village. They had encountered for a moment three mounted scouts, who retired on their approach, but no collision had occurred as yet between them and the inhabitants of the colony. Mr. Flynn circled round the village at a low altitude, and ascertained the condition of affairs. On the occasion of his former flight he had been unable to turn the Arabs from their attack by a demonstration of force without actual violence. On the second occasion his return created a panic among the invaders, which caused them to hurry from the village, carrying in their flight what loot they could. As they fled, the Arabs were hurried in their retreat by bombs and machine-gun fire. Their casualties were not so great as might have been expected. Three Arabs are known to have been killed and three wounded. Among the retiring Arabs, whom Mr. Flynn estimates as a crowd of between 400 to 500 persons, were the 10 mounted policemen. The Sergeant-Major asserts that he arranged his men in military formation so that the airman might observe that they were not a part of the mob, and avoid bombing them. Mr. Flynn observed that these were police, but from the fact of their retreatment with the raiders, regarded them as participating in the raid, and took no pains to discriminate between them and the rest of the crowd. Four of these were wounded, the Sergeant-Major severely, and three police horses were killed.

It was after Mr. Flynn had definitely put to flight the raiding Arabs that the armoured car and a second aeroplane, the latter in charge of Flight Lieutenant Routh, arrived.

It is on the observation of the airmen that we mainly rely in estimating the number of the raiders. Mr. Flynn, who was interested in observing the number of the persons with whom he had to deal, estimates the body of raiders whom he saw advancing in his first and retreating on his second flight as between 400 and 500 men. He could not say that those whom he observed were all the men engaged in the enterprise, but it was not difficult to see people in that flat plain, and he did not notice any further considerable body of men. There were few trees and little cover to hide the presence of a large body, and Mr. Flynn, on being pressed, could not be got to admit the possibility of there having been more than 1,000 men all told. In view of this opinion and observation of Mr. Routh, the second airman, who in his evidence mentioned smaller numbers, we are not prepared to find that a larger number of men than 1,000 were engaged at all in this raid, nor
that more than about 500 actually reached the colony. Of the latter number many were seen carrying loot on their retreat, but no raided cattle were observed.

The lives of the colonists were saved. They had been in great peril, and we have no doubt that had the raid not been interrupted, the colony would have been destroyed. At the moment that their great anxiety and fear were relieved, the reaction in the minds of the colonists manifested itself in a curious manner. We express no opinion of the amount of damage sustained. The looting and wreckage of furniture and household effects was appalling in its savage thoroughness. The indignation naturally aroused by the sight of their damaged property was turned, in the absence of the perpetrators, upon the unfortunate policemen who had arrived in the armoured car, and against others. The complaints made may be read in a written memorandum presented to the Government by the Committee of the colony, in which wild and unfounded accusations are recklessly launched against a number of individuals. We need say no more than that we have gone with some care into these accusations, and are unanimous in dismissing them.

What happened after the raid is of minor importance. The belated troops arrived, first foot and then cavalry. It was decided to search suspected villages for loot on the Saturday, with the aid of the military. That would have necessitated taking Jews with the troops to identify articles found and suspected to be loot. Major Tute, President of the Land Court at Nablus, was placed in charge of local operations by order of the Government, and he decided that in the then excited state of public feeling this search was inadvisable, and the plan was abandoned. The colonists were indignant, being of opinion that their interests were being neglected in order to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of Arabs, who were all more or less within the circle of a criminal conspiracy. We are not disposed to question the wisdom of Major Tute's decision.

There is one fact which has to be decided before this slender tale of the Khedera raid is complete, and it is this: 'Were Arab labourers imprisoned in Khedera for days, from noon of the 4th to noon of the 6th, as alleged, or at all?' Notwithstanding the persistence of this rumour and the evidence of four witnesses, who all swore to having been imprisoned by the Jews (and there were many more that were ready to give the same evidence), we disbelieve the whole story after carefully weighing the evidence and the probabilities. The place where these witnesses swore that they and others were imprisoned, to the number of 100 to 150, is a stable and yard, part of the very block where the Jews, with their wives and families, were in refuge during the raid. The airmen, as they circled above at a low altitude, could see into the yard, and they observed there only Jews and their animals. It is so improbable that the Jews who were then in terror of death should have imprisoned 100 to 150 Arabs in their midst that we have no hesitation in dismissing the allegation.

The raid on Khedera on the 6th May may be regarded as a sequel to the Jaffa riots on the 1st May, and belongs to the same sequence of events as the attack by Arabs on Petach-Tikvah on the 5th May.
The fact that there had been armed strife between Arabs and Jews, and that Arabs had been killed, was enough to set up a condition of acute excitement under the influence of which one thought only would predominate—that Arabs had been killed by Jews. No other circumstances would be taken into account. No rumour would be too preposterous to be believed.

The locality, of which Tulkeram is the administrative centre, contains about 40 villages and a number of Bedouin encampments. The people are of a particularly lively and passionate temperament, and are at the same time comparatively well educated. It is said that 40 per cent. of the population are able to read and write. It is overwhelmingly Moslem. There are a few Christians, one family of Samaritans, but no Jews.

Khedera, although only about 12 miles distant, belongs to another administrative district. It is an isolated spot in a sandy plain, and is hardly accessible from Tulkeram by motor car. The Jews of Khedera send their produce by rail or by sea, but do not sell it in the market of Tulkeram. It is all very well to say that there has been peace for a generation between Arabs and Jews. It was the sort of peace that exists between two bodies of men who have little or nothing to do with one another. In so far as there had been relations, Mr. Reading mentioned two causes of ill-feeling between the Khedera colonists and the people of Tulkeram, and its neighbourhood, though these causes were not serious, and contributed little, if at all, to produce the attack.

With the general attitude of the Palestinian Arabs towards the Jews, and the policy of the "National Home," in so far as it affected the events of last May, we propose to deal in our main report. Suffice it to say here that we found a very strong and clearly defined attitude among the villages around Tulkeram. The Mayor of Tulkeram talks about the Balfour Declaration, and, whether he has or has not a clearer notion of its import than other people, he certainly expresses his opinion about it very definitely. In a small Moslem centre of this sort the people are more politically minded than in a small English country town, and the discussion of politics is their chief, if not their only, intellectual occupation. A young Arab notable, a member of the local national club, told us that he and his friends read about Zionism in books and newspapers, and that chosen extracts are translated and read to those who are not able to read or understand English. He referred us to books in which, he said, they found statements that to them were both alarming and provocative.

Then again, the events of the Jaffa riots were grossly exaggerated. Two Arabs, mad with excitement, bared their breasts and shouted to the Sub-District Governor of Jenin, "We have seen women and children murdered by the Jews." They are rightly under arrest. There were rumours of Arabs murdered at Kalkilieh, imprisoned and even killed in Khedera, arms provided for the Jews by the Government and others. Anger and fear spread like fire. The fears which originated and stimulated these rumours were not simulated. Women, with their children, actually fled from villages supposed to be threatened. With all their intelligence, the people are credulous to an incredible
extent, provided that the rumours circulating are of a nature to excite an existing emotion.

It has been argued before us that the present state of popular feeling is due to an artificial agitation promoted by men who suffer by the change of Government, who, having lost the advantages they enjoyed under the corrupt régime, are anxious to embarrass the British Administration by any means, and to bring about a change of Government, and that they have chosen the obvious method of attacking the Jewish policy. They say also that the Sheikhs and moneylenders fear to lose their influence over the people if the Jews become a power in agricultural affairs. There may be some truth in these arguments, and it is not improbable that there are persons of the above categories who do what they can to promote discontent. But that is not enough to explain the present state of things. The educated people are sons of the soil, and they talk politics. They are too numerous to have as a body any substantial interest in a reversion to Ottoman Government.

It has been suggested that the inclination is towards government by France, on the ground that the French would make short work of Zionism, but we have no reason to suppose that this suggestion is correct.

Then we come to another question. It has been said that what the Arabs really want is loot, that when there is trouble they take advantage of it to pillage, that this love of pillage is at the bottom of every anti-Jewish movement. It is true that, generally speaking, when Arabs fight they also loot. That is not an extraordinary thing. You may count on the fingers of one hand how many years ago it is since a European nation made a systematic pillage a part of the practice of war. The Bedouin pillage without hate and without bloodshed if they meet with no armed opposition. It is not far from any part of Palestine to the other side of the Jordan, where the King's writ runneth not, and pillage is not regarded as theft, but as a gallant enterprise. During this enquiry Bedouin from over the border have raided for cattle in Palestine; but neither the village Arabs nor the local Bedouin ever raided Khedera before the Jaffa riots. The desire to pillage does not explain what occurred, although it probably was a stimulating element.

In regard to the blame to be attached to individuals, we may deal first with the case of Wadi Effendi Isawi, the acting Sub-District Governor. He was placed in a position of extreme difficulty, besieged by excited crowds for two days, and having to deal with movements arising from rumours, all of them in point of fact false, but causing him an immense amount of trouble and anxiety. Khedera was not within his administrative area, and he knew very little about it. At the same time it was his duty to prevent his people from raiding over the border. The current of excitement was not always running in the same direction, and on the morning of Friday it seemed to be bearing towards Kalkilieh. So concerned was he as to this that he went himself to that village. That Jews were attacking Moslems in that locality was so thoroughly believed that the whole country was in a panic about it. When he came back, he found the question of the
imprisoned labourers in the ascendant. Even then he did not realise that the colony was actually the object of an armed expedition. When he went there in his car it was not for the purpose of protecting the colony, but in order to clear up the misunderstanding about the imprisoned labourers. We think he did his best. It was difficult for a young Palestinian to command a situation of that kind.

With Mr. Beard the case is rather different. He is an Englishman, and was in charge of the police, and he ought to have taken the situation in hand. On no account ought he to have left Arab policemen in control of an Arab mob of such importance without the direction and encouragement of a superior officer, especially after the receipt of Sergeant-Major’s message from Kakon. Too much was expected of them. They were being swept along with the crowd, clinging to it, but quite unable to control it. We do not believe that they took part in or encouraged the raid; on the contrary, we believe that they did their best to dissuade the crowd from their enterprise. The officer in charge of the first aeroplane was of the contrary opinion, but he had no notion of the position in which they were placed, and jumped to the conclusion that because they were with the raiders, and not in the colony, they were participating in the raid.

In this connection a word remains to be said about Mr. Flynn, the officer in charge of the first aeroplane. Had he employed offensive measures against the raiders when he found them advancing to attack the colony, and when they refused to disperse on his making a demonstration of force, we have no doubt that the situation would have been saved, and the colony spared altogether. As it was, he returned in time to save the lives of the colonists, but not all the property. Had Mr. Flynn saved the situation by exceeding his orders and attacking the Arabs during his first flight, he might have got into serious trouble with his superiors. Popular agitation might have arisen, and he might have been made the victim.

We think there should be a general rule that when an armed crowd is proceeding for a hostile purpose, and will not disperse after a demonstration of force, it should be dispersed by force, unless it is obvious that some other means of preserving the peace are available.

We have stated above our opinion that the Indian troops sent from Haifa could not have arrived in time to stop the attack, even had they not been delayed at Kafr Samir station. On the other hand this fact does not absolve Naim Shaker Effendi El Khoury, the traffic inspector who accompanied the special train conveying these troops, from responsibility for not using his endeavours to avoid the delay. He was informed on arrival at Kafr Samir station that the special train would have to wait there for an hour in order to allow the mail train to pass. We consider that he should have taken the proper steps for his special troop train to take precedence of the mail train.

In this case it is clear that the colonists had done nothing whatsoever to provoke an attack. The armed crowd that proceeded to raid them intended to kill and loot, and it is a pity that they were not firmly handled before they had the opportunity of doing damage. The raiders cannot be excused because they believed a preposterous story
without examination. There was nothing to prevent them from discovering the truth about the alleged detention of the labourers. It is not within the scope of our enquiry to fix a legal liability on any individual or community, nor have we any judicial duty or function to perform, but we have throughout been anxious to arrive at a conclusion as to what individuals or villages should be regarded as responsible for the raid. As to the individuals who actually took part, a few names were mentioned in the evidence but it was not for us to call these men before us in order to invite admissions. Their names appear in the typed copies of the depositions, and they can be prosecuted if that course is thought desirable. We did, however, call the Mukhtars of those villages, against whom there was the least specific evidence, such as a statement that one of the villagers had been seen among the raiders. All of them in our opinion committed perjury with dignity and deliberation. They disclaimed all knowledge of the facts, except that in a few instances a Mukhtar would admit that he had been informed that labourers had been imprisoned at Khedera, and that their anxious relatives had proceeded there to make enquiry. One of these witnesses professed to have heard of the raid for the first time from the Chairman of the Commission. From the Mayor of Tulkeram to the Mukhtar of the smallest village in the list they were all resolute in their determination to admit no knowledge of any fact which could fix liability on any individual or village. It was evident from the tone and substance of what the Mayor of Tulkeram said to us, that he considered the raid as an act of war against the Jews, if not justifiable, at any rate excusable. He had done his best to keep his people quiet, but after the raid was over he was clear in his determination not to allow any person or village to suffer for it through his instrumentality. So unanimously is public opinion on one side of this controversy that evidence to fix responsibility is practically unobtainable, the more so as the colonists saw little or nothing of the raid. Nevertheless it is obvious that responsibility must be fixed for the wicked and unprovoked damage to property suffered by the Colony. We express no opinion as to the amount of the damage. It has been put to us at about £27,000. In view of the general unreliability of the statements made we need not assume that anything like that amount of damage has been suffered. Nor do we assume that it is the duty of the Government to collect damages; but it is the duty of the Government to preserve the peace and prevent disorder, and if law and custom recognise collective liability, two villages are, in our opinion, too deeply implicated to go free. These are Tulkeram and Kakon. Both were used by the villagers as places where they concentrated and from which they advanced. The headmen are fully aware of the whole circumstances. They must know what villages and what Bedouin are implicated. There is a prima facie case against Tulkeram and Kakon because armed mobs proceeded from those places to attack the Colony. If the inhabitants consider that by being thus singled out they are unjustly victimised the remedy lies with them; they have only to show what other persons or communities are involved in the same crime and ought to share the same responsibility. In a
different degree responsibility lies upon the camp of the Wadi Hawaret Bedouin. Not only was loot found in that camp, but there is other evidence which associates them with the raid.

We also had evidence to the effect that villagers of Kalkilieh, Zeta, El-Lar, Baka, At-Til, Der-Ghusun, Beit-Lid, Saffarin, Anebta, and the Bedouin encampment of Damaira were among the raiders. While, however, it is probable that several of the above villages, possibly all, were implicated in the attack, the evidence at our disposal is not conclusive as to their guilt. It has been established that of the Arabs employed as labourers at the colony, among whom a number of the surrounding villages were represented, many lived habitually within the colony limits, and only returned to their villages at intervals of one, two and three weeks, one month, and even six months. Thus there may have been among the attackers Arabs who had not been to their villages for a considerable period.

In conclusion we would observe that the evidence and the probabilities are alike against the allegation advanced by the colonists that the attack was premeditated and prearranged. Their further assertion contained in their statement to the High Commissioner that the organisers were "the Government employees" of Tulkeram and Nablus is too preposterous to merit serious attention. The attack was in all its elements an improvised affair; very little reflection will serve to suggest how very different would have been its results had it been the outcome of a deliberate plan.

In this report we have so far as possible avoided an incursion into generalities, preferring to reserve such matter for our main report. In like manner we reserve anything we may have to say in the way of recommendations.

A copy of the depositions of witnesses is attached as an appendix* to this report, also the documents produced before the Commission, together with an index.*

Signed this first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty one.

THOS. W. HAYCRAFT,
Chairman.

Members: H. C. LUKE.
          J. N. STUBBS.

* Not printed.
No. 3.
Report by the Commission of Inquiry into the Jaffa Riots.

PART I.—NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

INTRODUCTORY.

The disturbances dealt with in this report began with a riot in Jaffa on Sunday, the 1st May, 1921, followed by serious acts of violence in the same town on the two succeeding days, and local attacks on Jewish agricultural colonies on the Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of that week. To the same group of events belong sporadic anti-Jewish manifestations which occurred in Jaffa during June and as late as July.

On the 7th May a Commission was appointed by the High Commissioner for Palestine to inquire into the whole affair, and began its labours at Jaffa on the 12th May. The inquiry was held in public, but counsel were not invited to take part in the proceedings.

The persons appointed as Commissioners were Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine (Chairman), Mr. H. C. Luke, Assistant Governor of Jerusalem, and Mr. J. N. Stubbs, Assistant Controller of Land Registries. The Commissioners were assisted by three assessors representing the Moslems, Christians and Jews, Aref Pasha Dejjani, Elias Effendi Mushabbek, and Dr. M. Elish, gentlemen well acquainted with the conditions and sentiments of their respective communities. The assessors had no hand in drawing up this report and are in no way responsible for the opinions therein expressed, but they helped the Commission in many ways, especially in the examination of witnesses, whose evidence they followed with close attention. Mr. E. Bryant, of the Financial Secretary’s Office, was appointed Secretary of the Commission.

Including the time spent on the examination into the Khedera raid, which has been made the subject of a separate report,* the Commission sat without interruption from the 12th May to the 26th July, 1921, and heard 291 witnesses. The Khedera raid was one in the same series of disturbances with which the Commission has been engaged, and the two reports should be read together if it is desired to understand the whole aspect of the anti-Jewish movement which was responsible for these events, as it has appeared to the Commission.

DESCRIPTION OF JAFFA.

Jaffa is a sea-port of Palestine, about 40 miles distant by road, W.N.W. of Jerusalem, and connected with the capital by a railway.

* No. 2.
The old town, a labyrinth of narrow streets, winding among masses of picturesque old buildings, lies close packed behind the quay, and is inhabited mainly by Moslems; but both Christians and Jews have shops and offices in and adjoining that quarter. Along the sea shore to the south is the modern suburb of Ajami, inhabited by Moslems and Christians, while to the north, inhabited by Moslems and Jews, lies the Menshieh quarter, through which runs a main street lined on both sides by shops mostly kept by Jews. At the northern end of the important artery called Boustros Street, at a point known as Morums’ Corner, a road branches to the north-east leading to the Jewish suburb of Tel Aviv, and passing on its way through a small quarter known as the German Colony. Between Menshieh and a poorer quarter known as “Tin Town,” which is the northern continuation of Menshieh along the sea, is a sandy space separating these quarters from Tel Aviv. This sandy space was the scene of important events on the morning of the 1st May. Tel Aviv is a well-built quarter with a town hall and municipality of its own, and is not unlike a small modern Continental suburb. Behind the old town stands the Governorate, a large building containing the offices of the Jaffa district administration, and adjoining it are the municipal offices. Both buildings look across the main square of the town, with the principal mosque and the police barracks on the east side. The square connects the Ajami main street, Boustros Street, and a street which passes through the old bazaar to the quay. Behind the Governorate is a market known as the Suk-el-Deir. East of Jaffa and its suburbs are orange groves and gardens.

The large majority of the Christian population belongs to the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox, with the Catholics and the members of other Christian bodies, form something less than one-quarter, the Jews numbering more than a quarter, and the Moslems about one-half of the total population of 45,000.

Moslems and Christians are of that Syrian-Arab stock which peoples the towns of Palestine, and differ notably in appearance from the fellahin of the villages; these, again, differ from the more or less settled Bedouin to be found in the district. It must always, however, be borne in mind that among the Moslems of Palestine religious solidarity is such that there is no recognised difference of race. At the present time, moreover, the native Moslems and Christians not only claim the same Arab nationality, but constitute a united body as far as the political situation under discussion is concerned.

The non-Jewish working people of Jaffa, while forming a compact community, differ in important respects from a European proletariat. There are a large number of boatmen, porters, artisans and labourers, who inhabit principally old Jaffa, Menshieh, and “Tin Town.” They are sociable, credulous, excitable, readily collecting in crowds at any moment when any cause of excitement arises; but with Moslems there is no class consciousness, as in a European proletariat, cutting through the bonds of race and religion. There are no classes in the European sense of the word.

In Jaffa, as in most ports, there is an appreciable element of roughs and bad characters.
The "old" Jews of Palestine have always led more or less of a separate life, faithful to their race and religion, patient under adversity, treated with something less than social equality, but living on friendly terms with their neighbours. The Jewish agricultural colonists of European descent have founded prosperous communities, aided by the liberality of European co-religionists, and by their own intelligence and industry. They also have lived a separate life, but have given a good example to their neighbours as peaceful and industrious cultivators.

The "new" Jews associated with Zionist immigration have brought with them European habits of thought, are politically minded, and are apt to be advanced in their views on industrial matters. They have set up labour organisations with the usual public demonstrations and strikes characteristic of European labour activity. Before the 1st May, 1921, such activities were closely observed by the Arabs, but were treated as domestic affairs peculiar to the Jews, and created no general disturbances.

It was only when Arab discontent with Zionist manifestations and resentment against the new immigrants reached its climax that a demonstration of Bolshevik Jews became the occasion for a popular explosion. The appeal of a pamphlet circulated in Jaffa by the Bolsheviks, inciting the working class to civil war, was by a cruel coincidence of causes accepted, and the co-religionists of its authors supplied the majority of the victims.

The Jewish Labour Situation.

At this point it will be necessary to give a brief survey of Jewish labour politics in Palestine leading up to an account of the circumstances preceding the Labour Demonstrations on the 1st May, whose clash was the immediate cause of the disturbances.

The most important Jewish Labour Society in Palestine is known as the "Achduth Haavodah," and forms part of the right wing of the world-wide Jewish Labour Organisation, "Poale Zion." At a Congress of the "Poale Zion," held in Vienna in August, 1920, it was decided by a majority vote to affiliate with the Third International. The English and Palestinian representatives dissented from this decision, and ultimately Moscow refused to accept affiliation as the Congress insisted on the organisation retaining its specifically Jewish character. The "Achduth Haavodah" is concerned with the question of wages and the interests of the labourers generally, and is constitutional in its methods. In December, 1920, the "Achduth Haavodah" absorbed, or federated with itself, several other Jewish labour bodies previously independent, and now includes in its ranks the vast bulk of Jewish organised labour in Palestine. It is patriotically Jewish, in contrast to the group of extremists known as the M.P.S., who place the pursuit of class warfare above the claims of race or nationality. The members of this revolutionary group, which has always been small in numbers, had attempted, so far back as August, 1919, to win the Jewish labour bodies in Palestine to the principles of the Third International. Early in 1920 they were reinforced by several communists newly arrived from Russia, and formed themselves into an organisation known as the "Miflagat Poalim.
Sozialistim,” which means “Socialist Labour Party.” They are generally alluded to by the initials M.P.S., from which has developed the term “Mopsi” (the German word for “pug”), applied to them in derision by their opponents. They continued their efforts to capture the “Achduth Haavodah,” but, when these failed, determined, as a Left Wing of the “Poale Zion,” “to prepare the soil of Palestine for the Social Revolution.”

During October and the beginning of November, 1920, there were outbreaks of labour trouble among the Jews in Jaffa. There was at this time a considerable amount of unemployment among recently arrived immigrants, and the M.P.S., who were able to work upon the feelings of these dissatisfied men, aggravated the trouble where they did not originate it. On the 7th November the M.P.S. had become so emboldened that they placarded Jaffa and Tel Aviv with locally printed posters, in which they called upon all labourers in Palestine to take part in social revolution, to have nothing more to do with “the slaves of the British bayonet,” and to celebrate the 7th November, the anniversary of the establishment of Soviet rule in Russia, with a half-day’s abstention from work. The poster ended with the following sentiments:

“Long live the 7th of November, the Proletarian International.  
Long live the Soviet Russian Republic.  
Long live the Communist Third International.  
Long live Socialist Palestine.”

They followed up the poster with a demonstration, in which 30 to 40 persons, carrying a red flag, and headed by a woman from Alexandria named Charlotte Rosenthal, endeavoured forcibly to compel Jewish labourers to comply with the last part of their printed invitation. On the following day a number of Jewish labourers employed in shops and factories went on strike. The employees of a certain firm of furniture makers refused to strike, whereupon some of the organisers of the strike entered the shop, severely assaulted the manager, and broke the machinery. The police present had to be reinforced, and a fight took place between the police and the mob, which was entirely Jewish. Several persons were arrested, and two were convicted and fined for breaking machinery and assault. Other criminal proceedings against the ringleaders were subsequently abandoned by order of the Government.*

The headquarters of the M.P.S. were in a building in Menshieh known as the Borochoff Club, which also served the purpose of a labourers’ restaurant. These premises were raided by the police on the 7th November, and a quantity of Communist literature, M.P.S. membership cards, and other printed matter was seized. The numbers of the M.P.S. reached their highest point, nearly 300, at this period, after which they began to decline.

Hitherto the M.P.S. had devoted most of their energies to the endeavour to win over to their tenets the rest of Jewish labour. In

* The High Commissioner considered that the evidence was insufficient to secure a conviction.
this they had been unsuccessful. Not only the Jewish bourgeoisie of Tel Aviv, but the overwhelming mass of Jewish labour would have nothing to do with them, and regarded them with unfeigned hostility. They now turned their attention to the Arabs, and began to import Communist literature in Arabic from Vienna, the headquarters of the "Poale Zion." In this direction, too, their efforts fell completely flat, but their proceedings now commenced to fill the Arab population, which had hitherto taken little interest in them, with vague alarm. The Moslem-Christian Society addressed to the High Commissioner a letter in which they pointed out the danger of such a movement in Palestine, and the Governor of Jaffa urged that their activities should be curtailed, not so much because of the intrinsic importance of a few extremists, as on account of the powerful incentive which they gave to anti-Jewish feeling in the country. The District Commandant of Police made similar representations to the head of his department. The Government decided, however, to take no action. It was clear that the M.P.S. had failed to make an impression either on Jewish or Arab labour; numerically they were already on the wane, and it was felt that the best policy would be to ignore what was believed to be a moribund movement.

But the M.P.S. were not yet dead. In the spring of 1921 they made an attempt to open a branch in Petach Tikvah, to the indignation of the colonists, who promptly expelled them. On several Saturday nights in succession they had street fights with the people of Tel Aviv, and on the 5th March, after one of these fights the District Commandant of Police closed their club. Thereupon the members marched into Tel Aviv in fours, singing and playing instruments, and were fallen upon by the inhabitants and the boy scouts.

We will now revert for a moment to the "Achduth Haavodah." On the 27th April the Committee of the "Achduth Haavodah" applied to the Governor of Jaffa for leave to hold a demonstration on the 1st May. Mr. Miller, the acting Assistant Governor, on behalf of the Governor, who was absent from Jaffa, informed the applicants that it was not the wish of the Government to prevent any labour meetings having legitimate aims, and that the demonstration would be permitted on the conditions that it was to be non-political, that it should not leave Tel Aviv municipal limits, that no flags or banners were carried, and that the Committee assumed responsibility for any contravention of the Government's instructions. On the following day the Committee wrote to the Governor stating that they could not undertake that the demonstration would not be political, and claiming that "in no civilised country is it forbidden for workmen to carry the Labour flag on the Labour festival." They expressed their readiness, however, to assume responsibility for the members of their own organisation, while repudiating the responsibility for "outside people," and on this understanding permission to hold the demonstration was given.

In the course of Saturday the 30th April, Police-Inspector Cohen suspecting that the M.P.S. would probably attempt a demonstration on the following day, although no notice had been received from them on the subject, sent a secret service agent to the Borochoff Club to ask
for two of the M.P.S. leaders, Schulmann and Arié, and to ascertain their intentions. A woman opened the door, but refused to allow the man to enter, saying, "It is not your business what we are doing inside. Go back to your work. If we want to make a demonstration it is for us to decide, not for anyone else." Another policeman subsequently sent by Inspector Cohen reported that there was a meeting going on inside the club.

It will be observed that although the club had been officially closed by the police on the 5th March it was still being used by the M.P.S. as a meeting place.

On Saturday night the police caught four men and a boy, Jews, distributing proclamations printed, some in Hebrew and Yiddish, others in Arabic. The documents are similar in tenour, and both are signed by "the Executive Committee of the Palestine Communist Party." They call in violent language upon proletarians of all nations to unite in the fight for the Social Revolution, and upon Jewish and Arab labourers to join in overthrowing their oppressors and in "beating down your torturers and the tyrants among you."

The Hebrew and Yiddish appeal ends as follows:—

"Long live the first of May!
Down with the dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie!
Down with the Palestine rule of Force!
Long live the international solidarity of the Jewish and Arab proletariat!
Long live the Socialist World-Revolution!
Long live the dictatorship of the Proletariat!
All power to the Workmen's and Peasants' Council of Palestine!
Long live Civil War!
Long live Soviet Russia!
Long live the Third Communist International!
Long live the Palestine Communist Party!"

The Arabic version ends with the words:—

"Down with the British and French bayonets!
Down with the Arab and foreign capitalists!
Long live the Third Communist International!
Long live the Socialist World-Revolution!
Long live the dictatorship of the Proletariat!
Long live Soviet Palestine!"

1ST MAY: EVENTS AT MENSHEIHM.

Sunday, the 1st May, 1921, was Easter Sunday, according to the reckoning of the Orthodox Church. It was also a day of public demonstration according to the practice of European labour. Five days before a letter had been sent to all districts from the Criminal Investigation Department in Jerusalem, communicating a report that the M.P.S. might attempt to cause all Jewish workmen throughout Palestine to cease work on the 1st May. In European countries May Day is a day of general anxiety, but in Palestine nothing had previously happened to mark it as a day of trouble; and so optimistic
were the local authorities of Jaffa that Mr. Wainwright, the District Commandant of Police, had been given leave to absent himself for the time, and was away in the Gaza District.

This optimism, however, had not gone so far that no police precautions were taken. On the contrary, with the approval of Mr. Miller, the acting Assistant Governor, arrangements were made on the evening of the 30th April by Abdin Bey, the Assistant District Commandant of Police, who was acting as Commandant in the absence of Mr. Wainwright. Colonel Stirling, the Governor, was absent in the villages on Saturday but returned to Jaffa on Sunday. First Inspector Cohen was to go to Tel Aviv to look after the Labour Demonstration, whilst First Inspector Tewfik Bey was to prevent any possible demonstration on the part of the M.P.S. About 8 a.m. on the 1st May he went to the Borochoff Club, the headquarters of the M.P.S., and found 50 to 70 persons assembled there, all wearing red rosettes. He addressed himself to a well-dressed woman, who appeared to be the only person in authority present, and informed her that no M.P.S. demonstration would be permitted. This order was repeated shortly after by Mr. Miller in the presence of Abdin Bey and Tewfik Bey.

Tewfik Bey, who had with him a sergeant, one mounted man, and 11 foot policemen, posted his men so as to shut off the Moslem District from the city and the sea shore, and awaited events. Half an hour afterwards two of his men informed him that the M.P.S. had given them the slip and were assembled on the sea shore. He sent the sergeant with four men to the place. Meanwhile the M.P.S. demonstrators, carrying red-lettered banners and wearing their red rosettes, were making towards Tel Aviv and were followed by the police. The police succeeded in taking from them two banners, and also seized a basket containing a stencil, a brush, and a pot of red paint, which had been dropped by one of the demonstrators. When Tewfik Bey met them, he dispersed the demonstrators together with a crowd of Arabs, who expressed their disapproval of the demonstration, but had committed no act of hostility. Nevertheless, the M.P.S. managed to elude the police and reached the outskirts of Tel Aviv, to continue their demonstration in that quarter.

The two banners, which consisted of large pieces of white cardboard bearing inscriptions stencilled in red, were produced to us. They bore the following inscriptions in Yiddish:—

"Long live the Communist International."
"Long live the free Women of the Communist Society."

The stencil dropped by the demonstrator was mounted by our instruction, and was found to form an inscription, also in Yiddish, reading as follows:—

"Long live the First of May!"
"Down with English coercive Power!"
"Long live the Social Revolution!"
"Long live Socialist Soviet Palestine!"

In the meantime Mr. Cohen, with nine mounted men and eight foot police, had gone to Tel Aviv. The demonstration of the Labour Party
(“Achduth Haavodah”), for which, it will be remembered, permission had been given, did not begin till 10 a.m., and when it started he followed with six mounted men and a sergeant. Word had come from Tewfik Bey of the M.P.S. movement. The Labour Demonstration marched down the main street of Tel Aviv, followed by a crowd of boys, and, when it arrived at the end of the street, where stands the Gymnasium, the M.P.S. procession appeared, advancing from the left hand. To avoid it, the Labour procession turned to the right, but the followers at the tail came into collision with the M.P.S., and a scuffle took place, for which no one seems to have been any the worse. When the M.P.S. reached the procession an orator attempted to speak, but was prevented by a band of Jewish students. Later on there was a second collision between the parties near a building known as Spector’s Hotel. There was much noise, but the one serious injury inflicted was on a woman of the M.P.S. party, who was knocked down and badly wounded in the head. These two collisions were the first conflicts of the day.

After separating the parties, Mr. Cohen, who had been reinforced by police sent by Tewfik Bey, got the M.P.S. out of Tel Aviv and dispersed them into the sandy space which divides Tel Aviv from Menshieh.

About this time two Jews, who had fled from Menshieh to Tel Aviv, complained that they had been beaten by Arabs in the former quarter and that the police there would take no action. They had small wounds only.

From this time onward it is not easy to follow the precise sequence of events. The evidence is conflicting and much of it is unreliable. We must be content to present such a general narrative as embodies the conclusions we have arrived at during the hearing.

The Arabs of Menshieh, who had resented the Bolshevik demonstration from the first, became aware that a disturbance was taking place on the Tel Aviv side of the sandy space, and came out of their houses to the western edge of the sandy space, where they could observe what was happening on the Tel Aviv side. Many of them were armed with sticks. At the same time Jews began to collect on the eastern edge of Tel Aviv. It then became the duty of the police to come between the two parties and prevent a collision if possible. They occupied the sandy space, Mr. Cohen and his men keeping back the Jews, and Tewfik Bey with his men keeping back the Arabs.

The dispute between the Jewish Labour Party and the M.P.S. was now at an end, and demonstrators were beginning to disperse towards Menshieh. Had it not been for outstanding grievances felt by the Arabs against the Jews, the police would have had little difficulty in keeping the peace. The Arab population is ordinarily very obedient to authority, and it is only when some religious or racial emotion is aroused that it becomes difficult to manage. The Jews are less obedient to authority and more difficult to control; on the other hand, they are less prone to that sudden access of violence which characterises the Arab when aroused to anger by some actual or supposed wrong or provocation.
It became evident that the situation was growing critical, and shortly after noon Abdin Bey joined Mr. Cohen, and Reserve Inspector Atkins joined Tewfik Bey. Neither party was willing to return into its own quarter until the other had done so first. Some police in the sandy place fired their rifles into the air by order of Mr. Atkins. This was the first firing that was heard. It appears that most of the people who heard it were ignorant as to where the shots came from or who had fired them. It must have been almost immediately afterwards that something occurred in the Moslem quarter to draw the police and the Arabs back into the streets of Menshieh. Mr. Cohen says that reports were brought by Jews of their shops having been broken open and of shooting. That shooting was probably the firing by the police in the air by order of Mr. Atkins, as no persons appear to have been killed or severely wounded up to that moment. Mr. Cohen goes on to say that later he heard a noise in the Menshieh quarter, left his place at the sandy space, rode to the spot, and found Arabs breaking windows. It seems clear that at that moment police and Arabs left the sandy space, and poured into the Menshieh quarter, where a general hunting of the Jews began. We are of opinion that both Mr. Cohen and Tewfik Bey did their best to keep the peace, but the police lost control of the situation altogether.

At this time Mr. Miller was sent by the Governor to Tel Aviv on a report that the quarter was being attacked by Arabs. On arriving he found that firing was coming from the Menshieh quarter towards Tel Aviv, and being replied to from houses on the edge of the latter quarter, but that Tel Aviv was not being attacked. He proceeded to Menshieh and found that the police had lost all authority, and that there was a great deal of fighting going on.

Convinced that only military force could deal with the situation, he returned to the Governorate to find that Colonel Stirling had already telephoned to Military Headquarters at Ludd for troops, and to the Civil Secretary at Jerusalem for armoured cars. At the Governor's desire he then returned in a car with three Arab notables who had offered their services to quieten the people. They were Assim Bey el-Said, Mayor of Jaffa, Omar Effendi Bittar, and Abdullah Effendi Dejani. On reaching Menshieh main street they found the Jewish market there entirely looted, and looting was going on elsewhere. The presence of Mr. Miller and the notables, especially that of the Mayor, had the effect of stilling tumult at any spot where they appeared, but so exasperated had the two parties become by that time that this effect was only momentary, and fighting began again as soon as their backs were turned. At that time all the men in the streets were armed with sticks, iron bars, knives, anything that came to hand. Some of the mob still wore the red M.P.S. rosettes. The sergeant of the Military Police and his five N.C.Os. did useful work so far as their small number was effective, but the civil police in general were now wholly inefficient, either because they felt themselves unable to cope with the tumult, or because racial passion had become infectious and they were unwilling to make an effort to stem the rage of their own peoples. It is difficult to rely on the evidence of individuals engaged in the
melée, but we have formed the view that from this time the police became partisan, a view that is confirmed by subsequent proceedings.

1ST MAY: THE IMMIGRATION HOUSE ATTACK.

There is a large house and courtyard next door to the French Hospital on the east side of the Ajami main street, about five minutes walk uphill from the central square. It is known as the Immigration House, and is used as a shelter for newly arrived immigrants, who are cared for in that place until work is found for them. It is under the control of the Zionist Commission and has been a useful institution. It would have been wise, perhaps, to have found room for it in Tel Aviv, which is an exclusively Jewish quarter; but in the Ajami quarter it is removed from the working Arab population and is to a great extent out of the way of trouble. On May Day, however, it was a danger centre, and, when racial strife had arisen, something was likely to occur there.

The main building of the Immigration House, with ground floor and first floor, faces the main street, and the courtyard adjoins it to the north along the same street. Behind the principal house is a building with ground floor and attics, used as a dining room, reading room and offices, and the cook had her bedroom in the same building. Against the east wall of the courtyard is a corrugated iron building used as kitchen and wash-house. The entrance doors to all these buildings are in the courtyard. There are four means of entering the courtyard—one, the central gate, with two large doors, and a small door inserted for general use. What is generally called the side door is at the north-west corner, opening on to a passage leading to the courtyard. There are two other entrances, one between the main house and the French Hospital, the other south of the kitchen and wash-house.

At the time of these occurrences there were in the building about 100 immigrants, men and women. Some lived in the lower part of the Immigration Hospital, a detached building to the west, but all had their meals in the Immigration House. Most of these people were young men.

About 1 p.m. on the 1st May the Governor, having been informed that there was trouble at the Immigration House, sent Abdin Bey to see what was the matter, and that officer took with him First Inspector Assad Effendi Abud, Second Inspector and Prison Superintendent Hanna Effendi Bordcosh, and two policemen. On reaching the Immigration House they found crowds of Arabs at the main and side doors. The Arabs declared that the Jews were using firearms and were asking that they, too, should be supplied with arms. Abdin Bey says that in order to draw away the people he promised them arms if they would follow him to the police barracks. He left Hanna Effendi at the main entrance and two policemen at the side door. Abdin Bey then occupied himself with other matters and did not return until the tragedy of the Immigration House was over. Assad Effendi accompanied a part of the crowd to the Governorate.

Meanwhile Hanna Effendi was at the main entrance of the Immigration House. He was fully aware of the gravity of the situation. It
was he who had reported trouble to the Governor in the first instance, and he states that he had already seen Jews run out of the gate and beat a man in the street. When he returned with Abdin Bey he had seen men trying to break in at the side gate, declaring that the Jews had been shooting. He then went round to the main entrance, on hearing firing from that direction, and found two policemen with their rifles pointed at the gate. According to his account he told the police not to fire, and they obeyed, but the gate was broken open. We are satisfied from other evidence that the police did fire at the gate either just before or just after Hanna Effendi arrived there. Almost immediately afterwards one or, perhaps, two bombs fell in the street near the gate, thrown from the upper floor of the house. One man was killed and others were wounded. Hanna Effendi, according to his own statement, then told the crowd to disperse and went home to lunch. The door had been broken open by an angry crowd, a bomb had been thrown with fatal results, blood was flowing and the Inspector of Police, the only officer then present, went home to lunch. Before the bomb-throwing there had been stoning on both sides. There is credible evidence that the police had fired at the windows and that the police were firing at this time from a half completed building adjoining the north end of the yard.

We are satisfied from the evidence of the Reverend A. C. Martin, of the London Jews' Society, who saw much of what happened from a window on the opposite side of the main street, that the police in the street broke through the door and led a part of the mob into the yard. They broke into the ground floor of the main building and into the other buildings. Men who sought refuge by running into the street were beaten to death by the crowd. Others were killed inside the courtyard. The invaders came in from all the entrances when the defence had broken down. Only one woman was killed, namely by a shot fired through a window. Those women who escaped into the street were roughly handled by the crowd, but not killed. They were wounded, but not dangerously, and were sheltered from further harm by an Arab neighbour. Perhaps the most revolting incident was the conduct of one of the Arab policemen. He was at first regarded by the women as a protector, but he took advantage of the prevailing terror to rob them of their small possessions, and to two he made indecent advances, telling them that he was a Jew, with threats of violence if they refused to comply with his demands. They appear to have avoided this crowning act of brutality by escape. This man was convicted by a special Court for the trial of offences committed during the riots, and was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment. It must not be supposed that no resistance was made by the Jews. The toll of dead and wounded in the gruesome episode of the Immigration House was as follows:

13 Jews killed or mortally wounded and 24 wounded; one Arab killed and four wounded.

For some reason which we have not been able to discover the assault on the Immigration House ceased before the upper storey had been attacked. Most of the immigrants therefore remained uninjured, these
including Mr. Feinberg, who was in charge of the house. Looters, male and female, had been stealing linen from the wash-house, and what other articles they could find that had not been destroyed. At the Hospital behind the Immigration House the ground floor was looted, but the persons who lived there had been at the Immigration House for dinner. The Hospital itself, which was on the upper floor, had not been attacked, and the nurses and patients were untouched.

Mr. Jeune, Controller of Ports and Lights, was called from his office by information of extensive looting in the bazaar, where he found people of all ages and both sexes looting with impunity. Hearing that there had been trouble at the Immigration House, he proceeded there in his car with one of his Port Police, and on his way up the Ajami main street passed Arabs looting the shops. As he drove up to the Immigration House he saw four dead Jews lying in the street. When he entered the main gate he heard women shrieking, and saw dead and wounded lying in the courtyard. The Arabs in the courtyard fled through the side door, and Mr. Jeune went to the Immigration Hospital, where he found the patients and the nurses safe.

The dead and wounded were carried into the adjoining French hospital.

1st May: Arrival of the Troops.

During the occurrence of these events fighting in the Menshieh quarter continued unabated. The Arab majority held the upper hand for the most part, but at points where the Jews were more numerous they retaliated as best they could. Dead and wounded were carried to the Governorate, which became a distributing centre for the hospitals, Jews being sent to the Tel Aviv Hospital, and Arabs to the Government Hospital and the C.M.S. Hospital, both in the Ajami quarter. Many wounded Jews were also carried straight from Menshieh to Tel Aviv. A crowd of excited Arabs thronged the central square, and looters streamed from the bazars and the Menshieh market. The Governor was besieged with reports and complaints, true and false, and had no reliable machinery capable of dealing with them. The police were practically out of action, and nothing could mend matters until the troops arrived.

At 3.45 p.m. Captain Boutflower, with Lieutenant Hands and 80 men of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, arrived from Surafend by motor lorry. As they turned into the town two bombs were thrown at the lorry and exploded without doing any injury. A witness, who was stationed at a window at the back of the Palestine Hotel, says that these bombs were thrown by Jews. Lieutenant Hands was under the impression that they were thrown by Arabs. Arabs and Jews were in conflict within sight of the troops. After reporting to the Governor, Captain Boutflower proceeded to clear the Menshieh quarter. The soldiers marched down Boustros Street to Morum’s Corner, and then through the Menshieh to “Tim Town.” The crowds were easily cleared, guards were posted, and they returned to the central square. At the sight of the military the Jews came out in numbers and had to be cleared out of Boustros Street.
At 4.40 p.m. Lieutenant Bradshaw, Tank Corps, came from Jerusalem with two armoured cars and two tenders. Again a large crowd, which Lieutenant Bradshaw estimates at 4,000 to 5,000, had collected between the bazaar and the central square, but dispersed when the armoured cars arrived. The town was patrolled in sections. At one spot Arabs were found attacking a Jewish house, the inmates, men and women, screaming on the roof; the Arabs fled and the Jews were escorted to the Governorate. There was still trouble in Menshieh, where Jews were found beating four Arab men, a woman and a boy. One of the Arabs drew a revolver and shot a Jew dead.

Captain Hancocks with two other officers and 40 other ranks of the Royal Field Artillery arrived at 5.30 p.m. He drew a cordon round that part of the Menshieh district which lies between the main street and the sea, a mixed Arab and Jewish district, mainly Arab. The total casualties for 1st May were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dead and mortally wounded.</th>
<th>Wounded.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bullets</td>
<td>Bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The arrival of the troops had put an end to the riots for the time being, and the night passed quietly. On the following morning, the 2nd May, crowds of Arabs began to collect and were dispersed. A party of the R.F.A. found two families on whom the Jews had taken their revenge, retaliating for the wrongs of the day before. In the early morning Jews beat at the door of a house where an old Arab lived with his wife and baby and a small child, and, when the door was opened, shot the woman dead, wounding the baby with the same bullet. In the other case an Arab living with his wife and family was about to send away his family for greater security, when a party of Jews, led by a man whom the Arabs identified as a Jewish police sergeant from Tel Aviv, broke open the door. The Arab was shot in the stomach and beaten as he lay, and when his little daughter ran to her father her head was cleft by a blow from an axe. The woman was beaten and a boy wounded.

Between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m. in the morning there was casual firing from the unfinished houses on the western edge of Tel Aviv. About 10 a.m. an Arab crowd brought the dead body of a girl in a coffin to Captain Hancocks, declaring that she had been killed by Jews.
Events of 2nd May.

On Monday morning, the 2nd May, there occurred an incident, which has some importance in this narrative. Lieutenant-Colonel Margolin, D.S.O., was stationed at Surafend in command of No. 1 Battalion of the Palestine Defence Force. This was only a nucleus consisting of 24 N.C.Os. and 8 men, demobilised from the 38th (Judean) Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers. In command of the whole Defence Force was Colonel-Commandant Costello, V.C., whose headquarters were then in Jerusalem. The scheme of this Defence Force has since been abandoned.

On Sunday evening Colonel Margolin received information of the Jaffa riots. He is a Jew and was naturally anxious about his friends, and particularly about the safety of the Tel Aviv quarter. Next morning he went by car to Jaffa and found Tel Aviv in a state of high excitement and alarm, and clamouring for arms for defence. There were in Tel Aviv about 100 demobilised men of the Judean Battalion (38th Fusiliers). He went to see the Governor and found him and the Civil Secretary, Colonel Deedes, at the Governorate. He urged that some of the demobilised Jews should be given arms for the defence of Tel Aviv, but at first Colonel Deedes was disinclined to agree. The latter, however, had himself been to Tel Aviv and had witnessed the state of excitement prevailing there, and finally consented to allow 18 Turkish rifles, then in control of Mr. Jeune, to be taken to Tel Aviv, and there used for defence in that quarter only. It was understood by him that Colonel Margolin would be in charge of the men and would be responsible for them.

Meanwhile 17 N.C.Os. of the Defence Force at Ludd, who had left camp without permission at midnight on Sunday for Jaffa with their arms and, we believe, with ammunition, were in Tel Aviv, and their presence there must have been known to Colonel Margolin. He said nothing about them when he saw Colonel Deedes at the Governorate and asked for arms, and he states that he was ignorant of their having left Ludd until after Tuesday. Colonel Margolin was made responsible for the carrying out of his arrangement with Colonel Deedes, but he allowed Captain Jaffé of the Defence Force, then in Tel Aviv, to march 25 demobilised Judeans dressed in khaki uniform down to the Port Office to take possession of the 18 rifles promised by Mr. Jeune, and to march them back with fixed bayonets through the streets of Jaffa to Tel Aviv. This action was distinctly contrary to the arrangement made with the Civil Secretary, who intended that the arms should be issued at Tel Aviv, and it caused much irritation at the time. On the same day two of the absent N.C.Os. went to Surafend in a car, professing to have an order from Colonel Margolin and Captain Jaffé to take back to Jaffa all available rifles in camp. They could, however, show nothing in writing to this effect, and Major Neill, then in charge of the Defence Force camp at Surafend, refused to deliver the rifles. Without his consent or knowledge, however, they took four rifles with ammunition, and returned to Tel Aviv. There were therefore at that time in Tel Aviv 39 rifles, in addition to any firearms the inhabitants may have possessed. Colonel Margolin took no disciplinary action
against the men who had broken camp, and he left Palestine almost immediately after giving evidence before us.

At 11.45 a.m. on the 2nd May Major Knolles, R.F.A., arrived from Ludd with orders to take over command of the troops in Jaffa. He expected to find that martial law had been proclaimed, but ascertained that this was not the case. He protested to Colonel Deedes and to Colonel Stirling, and was told that the High Commissioner did not wish martial law to be declared if it could be avoided. He disposed the troops so as to isolate Menshieh, and ordered frequent patrols of that quarter and the sea shore.

Colonel-Commandant Byron, commanding the troops in the Ludd area, now proceeded to Jaffa by order of Major-General Sir Philip Palin, commanding the troops in Palestine, and reached the Governorate at 2.30 p.m. on Monday, when he took over command of the troops in Jaffa from Major Knolles. There arrived at about the same time 80 men of the R.F.A., bringing the number of troops in the town to about 200. Colonel Byron found a good deal of excitement still alive and a restless crowd in the central square, through which wounded persons were being taken to hospital. Isolated Jewish families were evacuated and the immigrants still in the Immigration House taken to Tel Aviv. The greatest excitement was caused by a report that two Arab children had been killed by Jews. A crowd collected, saying that Moslems were being killed by Jews and that they wanted to get at the Jews. As they seemed to be bearing towards Tel Aviv, Lieutenant Lucas, Orderly Officer to Colonel Byron, headed them off in an armoured car and prevailed on them to disperse. The missing children were afterwards found unhurt.

Major Montefiore, Commandant of the Palestine Police Training School, arriving at 3.15 p.m., brought with him the personnel of the Police Training School, comprising four officers, nine mounted and 36 unmounted men of other ranks. The men had all had police experience and a good number had military training. Major Montefiore took over the police command from Abdin Bey. Almost immediately on his arrival an incident occurred which caused some excitement. A soldier had shot a Christian Arab who was supposed to have been looting. It was probably a mistake, but it must be remembered that the troops had been handling a difficult situation and had been on duty all night, and it was not surprising that an incident of this kind should occur when tired soldiers have to deal with an excited population in perpetual movement. Colonel Byron ordered that the troops were not to fire unless their lives were in danger, and this was the only occurrence of the kind that happened during these troublesome days. Another incident which occurred during the same afternoon will show the unreasonable frame of mind of the crowd at that time. Major Montefiore found the crowd in the Ajami quarter, which declared that there was in a certain house a Jew, to whom a soldier had handed his equipment. The facts were these: A soldier guarding a store or warehouse was sitting within and had placed his equipment on one side. Seeing a Jew run down the street seeking refuge, he pushed him inside and shut the door, forgetting for the moment his equipment,
which the Jew handed to him from a window. Now the idea that Jews were being armed was a frequent cause of excitement during those days, and the crowd refused to disperse until the Jew was removed. The crowd was so excited and the Jew so panic-stricken that the latter had to be taken away in an armoured car. The Training School Police took over the police guards.

A horrible murder was disclosed during the afternoon. Mr. Brenner, a Jewish author of some repute, was living with five other Jews in an isolated house off the Ramleh Road. The women of the house were absent. A motor lorry was sent to bring them away, and the house was found to be closed and empty. Some distance away five bodies, those of Brenner and four others, were found lying in a footpath, beaten or stabbed to death. The sixth body was found about 100 metres away with the hands tied behind the back. When the searchers returned to remove the bodies the sixth was not discovered, and has not been seen since.

A group of Jewish houses near the German Colony was entirely looted on Monday. The inhabitants had fled and there was no loss of life.

Constant complaints were made by the Arabs as to Jews being dressed up as British soldiers. Colonel Byron refers to this in his evidence, and Major Montefiore remarks that the crowds manifested no anti-English feeling, but said that the soldiers were not English—that they were Jews. We are disposed to believe that the activities of the 39 armed men in khaki had not been confined to Tel Aviv, which was never attacked. In the medical return for Monday, which we append it will be noted that six Arabs were killed and six wounded by rifle fire on that day. One of them was killed, as we have related above, by a British soldier.

Monday, May 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bullets</th>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Stabs</th>
<th>Blows</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Bullets</th>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Stabs</th>
<th>Blows</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may be a useful warning for the future to observe that in time of civil strife the wearing by civilians of any dress resembling British uniform is a dangerous factor in creating misunderstanding between the Government and the people, and in keeping alive a feeling of distrust and alarm. Moreover, the conduct of such civilians is liable seriously to detract from the prestige of the uniform and of the military.
Events of the 3rd May.

On Tuesday, the 3rd May, Mr. Wainwright, the District Commandant of Police, returned to Jaffa and resumed command of the police. At noon "A" Squadron of the 31st (Indian) Lancers, consisting of about 120 men with two British officers, arrived from Jerusalem.

On the Monday evening Colonel Byron had pressed for the declaration of martial law. He says in his evidence that "without this proclamation the authority was divided and uncertainty prevailed in the mind of the troops as to what action they should take in the event of certain eventualities—as to what powers they had. The Governor spoke to the High Commissioner and he spoke to me on the telephone, stating that he had given orders for martial law to be proclaimed." The Government had been, up to that time, averse on broad grounds from a declaration of martial law unless it was absolutely essential, and were not convinced that any greater advantage would be obtained under martial law than under the normal authority. It is true that soldiers are entitled without the declaration of martial law to do whatever the police or private citizens may do in assisting the local authorities to protect life and property, and to use their arms for that purpose when necessary; but soldiers are not lawyers, and they will not ordinarily incur the very serious risks, legal and otherwise, of taking the means necessary to deal with mob violence unless protected by a declaration of martial law.

After martial law was proclaimed Colonel Byron removed all the civil police from Menshieh and took over the quarter himself for police purposes, and, after consultation with the Governor, came to the conclusion, with which the Governor concurred, that the police in the town were better without arms. The town was still in a state of excitement. The old story of Jews in British uniform committing acts of violence was revived by the Arabs, and Colonel Byron issued an order that "any man found wearing British uniform or cap, without authorisation, was at once to be arrested and placed in prison."

The demobilised Jewish soldiers at Tel Aviv, to whom the 18 rifles had been delivered, were still under the command of Captain Jaffé. Colonel Byron proceeded to Tel Aviv and paraded these men, both those armed with rifles and those armed with sticks. It was explained to them that, martial law having now been declared, irregular forces could not be countenanced, and that the arms were to be handed over and the men to abandon their uniforms by 6 a.m. next morning. This order was carried out.

The Feingold Hotel case belongs to Tuesday. This was a house on the sea shore, where a number of Jews were quartered. It also contained the offices of the Kadem Building Company. Hearing that a bomb had been thrown from these premises, Colonel Byron had them searched. There were found three and a-half tins of explosives and 100 detonators, belonging to the Building Company, and used for blasting purposes. The supposed bomb has been explained to us as a detonator thrown into the street to scatter some Arabs who were molesting a Jew. We are inclined to believe this explanation. The tins of explosives contained about 7 lb., and were taken out to sea and
thrown overboard by order of Colonel Byron. Undue importance has
been attached to this episode, which has no significance of any sort.

The medical report for Tuesday gives the following particulars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Killed or mortally wounded.</th>
<th>Wounded.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bullets</td>
<td>Bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARABS.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEWS.</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

It may be that some of the dead were wounded on an earlier date, because on Tuesday violent attacks seem almost to have ceased. It was rather a day of constant unrest. The notables of both parties aided in the preservation of order, but the telephone at Tel Aviv Town Hall was a fount of perpetual false rumours, and the military were kept in continual movement, inquiring into unfounded reports. No other event of importance occurred on this day except a visit of the French, Italian and Spanish Consuls to the Governor. These gentlemen presented certain complaints of which the most important appears to have been that concerned with the story of the soldier, the Jew and the equipment, which is included in our narrative of the events of Monday. There is also to be recorded a visit of the Latin Patriarch, who seems to have been persuaded that the Government had been disarming the police in order to arm the Jews. It was only with some difficulty that His Eminence was disabused of this misconception.

**Events in Jaffa of 4th May and After.**

Early on Wednesday morning, the 4th May, a party of 150 immigrants had to be removed from the docks to Tel Aviv for safety.

Later on an angry crowd collected in the square. There was a story current of two children who had been murdered by Jews. The crowd surged down Boustros Street, bound for the German Colony of Tel Aviv, but were headed off by Major Pery-Knox-Gore, who was in a motor car and persuaded them to return. The children were afterwards found unhurt.

On the same day the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment was relieved by a Company of the Highland Light Infantry, and left next morning en route for Egypt. The detachment of the 16th Brigade, R.F.A., returned to Surafend. The gunners and the men of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment had undergone a severe strain, having been on duty for practically 72 hours with hardly any sleep. It is to be noted
that the Infantry were mostly young soldiers, and they, with the gunners, had been kept on the alert by a restless population in a state of constantly recurring excitement. Their general good temper throughout these trying days is a convincing proof of their fine quality and discipline. H.M.S. "Calypso" arrived on Wednesday night, and on Thursday morning landed 50 men, who took charge of the Old Jaffa quarter.

As this eventful week drew to its close actual disturbances of the peace ceased, but public uneasiness was by no means at an end. The hostility of the Arabs showed itself in a refusal to sell their provisions to Jews.

The general situation had improved, but the state of feeling was obviously still acute. Popular unrest had spread to the surrounding country, and by Friday night there had been attacks by Arabs on five Jewish agricultural communities. All parties were looking to the Government for some distinct declaration of policy. Colonel Byron says: "As far as the Moslem population were concerned, they were very anxious to receive some declaration on the question of immigration. I gathered such information from both parties, i.e., the notables here, and Mr. Dizengoff, the Mayor of Tel Aviv." He had already issued an order under his general authority that no immigrants should be landed at Jaffa for the present. On the morning of Saturday, the 14th May, a telegram was received from Government House confirming the temporary prohibition of immigration, and, when made known by the town crier in the square, was received with acclamation.

Things then grew more quiet, but the boycott, which had become reciprocal, continued. On Saturday, at the request of the High Commissioner, Musa Kiazim Pasha, a prominent leader of Moslem opinion in Palestine, came down from Jerusalem for the purpose of examining into the situation. Later in the same day he reported to Colonel Byron that in his opinion normal conditions could be restored in three or four days, but he deprecated immediate action against the persons encouraging the boycott. Nevertheless, Colonel Byron, who was of opinion that the continued unrest was due to a great extent to the incitement of certain Moslems and Christians, decided on Monday, the 16th May, to take action. He ordered the preventive arrest of seven Arabs and their removal to Jerusalem. At the same time he had reason to believe that the conduct of certain Jews was prejudicial to the public peace, but for considerations which he deemed sufficient, he hesitated to remove them at once. But on the 18th May three of the latter were arrested and removed to Jerusalem. "From that time," says Colonel Byron, "the shops began to open and the town became more normal every day."

In the course of the month the Government proceeded to arrest members of the M.P.S., and 15 non-Palestinian Jews convicted of having belonged to the group were deported from Palestine.

During June there were occasional ebullitions of feeling, showing that passions had not yet subsided. On the 13th June an Arab ran amok in a Jewish shop in Menshieh, killing two Jews and wounding
others. The Arab was arrested and found by a medical board to beimane.

Certain elements of the Arab population, particularly the boatmen,
displayed a truculent attitude towards the landing of Jews, not of the
immigrant class, at Jaffa; and several Jewish passengers were com-
pelled to disembark at other ports. This attitude culminated on the
30th June in a serious incident, thus described in a communiqué issued
by the Government:

“A ship arrived on 30th June, carrying 10 Palestinian Jews
from Beirut. The officer commanding at Jaffa, which
is still under martial law, had been instructed by the High
Commissioner to ensure the landing of the passengers,
but in doing so not to use more force than was necessary.
The approaches to the quay were accordingly picketed.
The Colonel Commandant reports that the passengers
were landed without incident, but as the picket were
about to return to their billets, the Arabs suddenly
attacked one of the pickets near the town square and
simultaneously shots were fired at the picket, one of
which, directed from the roof of a house, killed an Arab
standing behind the picket, and another Arab, who had
seized a soldier’s rifle, was seriously wounded. The
troops fired in retaliation, wounding an Arab, while
another Arab was wounded as the result of attacking
a sentry in the Menshieh quarter. So far no other
casualties have been reported, and this afternoon the
town was quiet.”

About 9 a.m. on the 7th July a Jew was shot dead in the Ajami
main street, one of the principal thoroughfares of the town, approxi-
mately half way between the main square and the Immigration House.
An Arab was arrested in connection with the murder, but was acquitted
owing to lack of evidence. There must have been many witnesses
of the event; and the fact that evidence was not forthcoming sufficient
to secure the conviction of the murderer, whoever he may have been,
indicates a state of feeling which at present makes it difficult to bring
offenders to justice when the question of race is involved.

At the time of the preparation of this report the Courts were still
investigating cases arising out of the disturbances, and no complete
record of these can therefore be given, especially as the results of trials
by the Military Courts have not been promulgated.

**ATTACK ON KEFR SABA AND AIN HAI.**

In their most dangerous manifestations, and as bringing about a
temporary breakdown of civil government, the Jaffa riots may be
regarded as confined to those waves of popular violence which flooded
certain parts of the town of Jaffa on the 1st May. Many acts of
violence were perpetrated during the following day and in lessening
degree on Tuesday; and in a wider sense one may say that the Jaffa
riots were not at an end until the afternoon of the 3rd May.
But the disturbance set up in Jaffa during those three days reacted in other directions. Its effect in Samaria as far as Nablus to the N.E., and the anti-Jewish raid on the colony of Khedera, which lies within the District of Phœnicia, have been described in our interim report on the Khedora episode. In the Jaffa District four more Jewish colonies were attacked. The political unrest, which for a long while had been fomenting in the minds of the Arabs, rendering them readily responsive to any provocation, real or supposed, was the same throughout. But the immediate cause of the attacks on Jewish agricultural colonies was their belief in exaggerated rumours of the killing of Arabs by Jews in Jaffa. If the Arabs were aware of the fact that more Jews than Arabs had been killed in Jaffa (and in all probability they knew little or nothing of the details), that, we believe, was not the material question. It was enough for them that Jews had been killing Arabs.

No inference is to be drawn from the chronological order of these subsequent events. What is important is the rapidity with which they followed on the Jaffa riots.

The Jewish agricultural colony of Kefr Saba is situated about 14 miles N.E. of Jaffa, the larger colony of Petach Tikvah lying about half-way between. About three miles to the north is the Arab village of Kalkilieh; and the small Arab village of Kefr Saba lies between the Jewish colony of the same name and Kalkilieh. One of its first colonists informed us that Kefr Saba was founded 15 years ago by some 20 persons with the aid of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, that before the War the colony had 22 dwelling houses, and 5,000 dunums under cultivation, that the Turks during the War cut down and uprooted so many trees for military purposes that they were then cultivating only 1,000 dunums. The village had been in the line of fire and most of the houses had been destroyed, but to a great extent these had been rebuilt since the War.

On the evening of the 2nd May there was an alarm of an Arab attack. Five Arabs who visited one of the houses that evening fired a few shots, but no injury resulted, and no doubt the action was intended to create a scare. There is no evidence of what happened at Kefr Saba beyond the testimony of the colonists, and we prefer to describe what happened in the words of the witness above referred to:

"On Tuesday morning, the 3rd May, the Arab labourers came to work as usual. After working a few hours they returned to the houses, handed in their tools and implements, and went back to their villages. I asked one of my labourers from Kalkilieh, 'Why do you leave your work and go to your village?' and he told me, 'Yesterday evening there was a great meeting in our village, and it was decided to attack Jaffa, and on our way to go in to Kefr Saba. We only wait for the decision of Jaffa, and of Tireh and of Miska.' He said 'that the labourers did not pay attention to the resolution of the majority, and went to work as usual, but that after a few hours messengers came from Kalkilieh to call them back to the village.' He added that the labourer advised him to go to Petach Tikvah, and promised to look after their property.

The colonists, in alarm, abandoned their village, and went to the small colony of Ain Hai, which consists of four houses, leaving a few
horsemen to patrol the village. Whilst they were at Ain Hai the patrol rode over, telling them that they had seen a great crowd approaching the colony from Kalkilieh and the Arab village of Kefr Saba. The colonists of Kefr Saba and Ain Hai then retired in a body to Petach Tikvah. The same witness says that while they were on their way the Arabs of Abu Kishk raided their cattle, which they were taking with them, and seized 20 head.

When, on the 6th May, Kefr Saba was visited, it was found that two houses had been burned, and the remainder robbed of their roofs, windows, and floors. One house was entirely destroyed, together with a pump and engine, and much damage had been done to cultivation. A visit to Ain Hai on the same date disclosed the destruction of that colony.

**ATTACK ON PETACH TIKVAH.**

Petach Tikvah (in Arabic, Mulebbis) is a large Jewish colony, about seven miles N.E. from Jaffa, and to the east high road from Jaffa to Nablus. It is said to have been one of the costly experiments of Baron de Rothschild, but looked at as a total achievement it is a fine agricultural colony, with 25,000 dunums under cultivation, including groves of oranges and almond trees, olive yards and vineyards, together with extensive field cultivation, grazing land and stock. It is well wooded, with eucalyptus trees and hedges of mimosa. The houses are well built, and form a comfortable village. The inhabitants lived on good terms with the Turks, and with their Arab neighbours, and were never disturbed before the British occupation. The population amounts to about 3,500 souls.

On the 5th May, Captain A. R. Hudson, of 8th (Indian) Cavalry, was on his way from Jenin to Jaffa, via Petach Tikvah, with a squadron of about 90 horse. He was followed at a short distance by Lieutenant Vickers with another squadron of the same regiment. About two miles from Petach Tikvah Captain Hudson was met by two horsemen, who informed him that the colony was being attacked by large numbers of armed Arabs, that many Jews had been killed, that their defence was broken down, and that all the Jews had retired into the colony. After a ride of about one and a half miles they arrived at a spot some 400 yards from a small ridge, on which stood a packing house. The ridge, Captain Hudson has told us, was held in force by the Arabs. After sending a section to the village to reconnoitre, Captain Hudson opened fire with his Hotchkiss guns, and drove the Arabs from the ridge. He then proceeded to cut off their retreat, and saw the horizon, as he describes it, black with people—from 1,000 to 2,000—retreating on foot and on horseback. He came into contact with a party of the fugitives, and about six of them were shot. Passing the ridge on his way to the village he saw about 15 bodies of Arabs lying there. During this attack, although many of the Arabs were armed with rifles, four Jews only appear to have been killed, but others were wounded; and the Arabs had approached so close to the village that houses in the vicinity had been looted, and a woman wounded by rifle fire in the village.
Captain Hudson's squadron, with tired horses, entered Petach Tikvah. This squadron had been occupied the night before in checking a raid in the neighbourhood of Tulkeram, and was in need of rest. Lieutenant Vickers had arrived with his squadron, and took over the rest of the operations.

Early on this Thursday morning, Mr. Peretz Pascal, one of the original colonists and a leading man in the community, on finding that his Arab herdsman had not come to work as usual, rode into the pasture to get in his cattle, and saw a number of Arabs marching from the Bedouin camp of Abu Kishk. Some such movement was not unexpected. Mr. Pascal returned to the village, where, from a house in a commanding position, he could see Arabs crossing the ford of the Auja river. He rode at once to Jaffa, where he encountered Major Knolles, and reported what he had seen. The latter telephoned to Ramleh for an aeroplane, and sent an armoured car, in charge of Lieutenant Bradshaw, to Petach Tikvah, with Mr. Pascal as guide. In reply to the telephone message of Major Knolles an aeroplane was sent at once with Flying Officer Flynn, leaving Ramleh at 12.30 p.m., with orders to disperse concentrations of Arabs near Petach Tikvah by demonstrations, but not by direct hits. South of the village he saw about 400 Arabs, of whom 20, he estimated, were carrying rifles. He dropped four bombs in front of their advance, and they began to disperse towards the village of Yahudieh. Mr Flynn then flew over the village, and dropped a message to say what he had seen. On receiving the message Lieutenant Vickers, with his cavalry, galloped down the track leading to Yahudieh with a guide, Mr. Blum, a colonist, who had already acted as guide to Captain Hudson. His objective was a low ridge lying east and west about 1,200 yards from the outskirts of the colony. The aeroplane followed and circled over the Arabs with the object of indicating their position to the cavalry; but as the cavalry advanced, a body of the fugitives fired a ragged volley from the long grass where they were seeking cover, and a horse was hit. The Arabs again fled, and were engaged by the cavalry in an extended line. In this engagement seven Arabs killed and 14 wounded were counted by Lieutenant Vickers. Whether any dead were undiscovered or conveyed away, and how many wounded escaped to their villages, is unknown. The armoured car had stuck in the sand on its way to Petach Tikvah, and Lieutenant Bradshaw had proceeded in the tender which accompanied it. Arrived at the village he was informed of what had occurred, and proceeded south again with Mr. Pascal as guide. He tells us that he encountered two large bodies of Arabs, one led by an Arab Civil policeman, that he opened fire in each case and scattered them, inflicting casualties, and that he actually saw the policeman drop. The so-called Arab policeman has never been identified or traced, and we are of opinion that Lieutenant Bradshaw was mistaken. It is more likely that he was a villager in an old uniform, and extremely improbable that a policeman would deliberately lead a raid in uniform. In any case, had a policeman been killed, his superior officer must have become aware of his disappearance.

The cavalry made only one charge. Mr. Blum, the guide, was left
behind as the squadron moved forward. Lieutenant Vickers noticed at the moment of charging that there was another Jew mounted on a brown or chestnut pony, with two rifles slung round his back. This man was seen riding away when Mr. Vickers returned.

The dead and wounded were collected and sent by cart to Petach Tikvah. The arms that were collected consisted of three Turkish rifles, an old shot-gun, several pistols and a good many swords and spears. The carts containing the wounded and dead were guarded by the cavalry, but a certain number of Jews accompanied them as drivers and followers. During the transit there was committed an act which we have not been able to trace to the perpetrators. Someone—it is said a driver—poured some corrosive acid over at least one of the wounded, who was badly burned on the neck and limbs, and is entered in a footnote to the medical tables. Two others have been mentioned as having been burned, but the cases have not been verified.

There are questions connected with the operations against the Arabs from Yahudieh which have never been satisfactorily cleared up. What most struck our attention was the number of wounds inflicted on several of the men. The dead bodies were observed to have been wounded from three to five times, and may have had more wounds, because a dead body is not necessarily exhaustively examined. The wounded we examined had generally more, and one man had as many as 10 wounds. The wounded men told us a curious story, which was in the main undoubtedly false. It was this: that while they were reaping in their fields they were attacked by Jews on horseback, and wounded. They mentioned by name Mr. Blum and a Mr. Shapiro as having dismounted to attack them, and Mr. Pascal as having left a car for the same purpose. According to this story it was the arrival of the Indian cavalry that saved them: they were wounded by Jews and saved by cavalry. Now the Arabs were on their own lands when attacked, for the Yahudieh lands run in a strip from that village almost to the village of Petach Tikvah. Again, the place where they were wounded was not a cornfield, but rough land with high grass, and they were armed with firearms and other weapons. The only Jews known to have been present at the time of the charge were Mr. Blum and another Jew, and Mr. Pascal. Mr. Pascal was with Lieutenant Bradshaw, and was certainly not fighting. Mr. Shapiro has sworn that he was not present, and he has not been identified as the man with the two rifles on the chestnut pony. There remain Mr. Blum and the unidentified horseman. It was after we had heard the evidence of Lieutenant Bradshaw and the other witnesses in the Petach Tikvah case that we were informed that the Indian soldiers had a story of Mr. Blum and another Jew, supposed to be identified with Mr. Shapiro, which ran as follows: after the cavalry had charged, and the dead and wounded lay in the grass, and a few uninjured Arabs stood in an attitude of surrender, Mr. Blum, with his revolver, shot some of the wounded, and the other man shot five of the unwounded men with a rifle. Mr. Vickers, who was re-examined on this point, told us that he had ridden ahead, and did not see the Jews fire at anybody. Mr. Blum and Mr. Shapiro were given an opportunity of answering the
charges, if they so desired, and each elected to do so. They denied the accusations made against them, and Mr. Shapiro said that he was not present at all. These matters are the subject of a criminal investigation, and we have no more to say about them than that, according to the evidence produced before us, Mr. Shapiro has not been identified as the man with the two rifles on the chestnut pony.

The colonists of Petach Tikvah complained that 400 of their cattle had been stolen during the raid, and were believed to be at the "White House," the seat of the Sheikh Abu Kishk. Military operations against the White House were delayed by rifle fire from the house and the surrounding buildings. On the 7th May the Sheikh had surrendered, but could not or would not secure the surrender of the arms of his tribe and the stolen cattle. He had been told that his house would be burned if he did not comply with the above conditions, and, as he failed to do so, the house was burned. It was a house of three rooms, and all articles of value had been removed. The Sheikh was taken before a Military Court on charges arising out of the raid, and his case is still, we understand, under consideration.

It is impossible to give an exact account of the casualties inflicted on the Arabs in the two attacks on the colony, the one from the north and the other from the south.

The casualties treated by the medical authorities are set out in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dead or mortally wounded.</th>
<th>Wounded.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The multiplicity of wounds inflicted on certain of the Arabs has been previously referred to. In addition to the 28 Arab dead recorded by the medical statistics, there is evidence that the Abu Kishk tribe of Bedouin removed the bodies of about 20 of their followers.

**ATTACK ON REHOBOTH.**

On Friday, the 6th May, there was an important Moslem festiva at Ramleh in honour of a local saint. It is an annual festival known as Nebi Saleh, and it attracts a large number of people. From 25,000 to 30,000 are said to have been present on this occasion. There had been a question whether the festival should be allowed in view of the popular excitement existing in the district at the time, but Mr. Miller,
the Sub-District Governor of Ramleh, had been assured by some of the leading notables that they would guarantee the good conduct of the people, and the holding of the festival was permitted. The Civil Secretary, the District Governor, General Palin, and others were present. Mr. Wainwright was escorting the procession with 35 police, mounted and on foot. Before the festival was over a number of men were noticed moving towards the Jewish colony of Rehoboth (El-Deiran).

That colony is about four miles from Ramleh, on the road to Gaza, and the Arabs returning to the latter town would pass near Rehoboth. But this was something more than a homeward movement of the pilgrims. Mr. Miller had already noticed persons creating excitement in the crowd; and a rumour was reported that the Jews of Rehoboth had attacked the neighbouring Arab village of West Zermuka. That rumour was without foundation, and Mr. Miller is of opinion that it was deliberately concocted by certain notables to provoke an attack upon the Jews. There were cries of "Down with the Jews."

When it became clear that an attack on the colony was imminent Mr. Miller sent a message to the Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force at Ramleh to send aeroplanes to Rehoboth to keep back the crowd. Mr. Wainwright, with an officer and 12 mounted policemen, rode towards the colony. He came up with a number of men on the road, whom he estimates at about 600. These he stopped, and, leaving his officer and men to keep them back, rode on with a mounted orderly and met another crowd of 150 to 200 on the road near the colony. By enlisting the services of people whom he met, and whom he knew personally, he kept back the crowd for the moment. But the raiders were too eager to be so easily diverted, and they broke off the road into the orange groves, bent on reaching Rehoboth in that way. Realising that the affair was too serious to be handled successfully without the aid of the military, Mr. Wainwright rode to General Palin's house at Bir Salem, not far distant, and met the General, who had by that time returned from the festival, and promised to send troops. Riding towards the colony, he saw a column of smoke rising from an orange grove, and on reaching the spot found a garden house on fire. He was then joined by Mr. Miller, who had gone by car to Bir Salem, and thence on horseback. He had taken with him Sheikh Amin El Khawaji, M.B.E., who used his influence on the way to persuade the villagers to go home quietly. The fellahin were, however, not so easy to deal with, and kept on repeating: "They are attacking our brothers in Zermuka and we must take our revenge."

At the time that Mr. Miller and the District Commandant of Police were at the burning house an aeroplane flew overhead from Ramleh, and no further advance was made by the Arabs. Then came the Indian cavalry, and the retreat became general. Meanwhile there had been a defence on the side of Rehoboth. There was a picket of the R.F.A. in the colony, armed with pick handles. The officer in charge was indignant with certain of the colonists who had been firing at the Arabs at long distance range, and he objected strongly that the defence was his affair. It is not unlikely, however, that this rifle fire had kept the Arabs back. They could see the soldiers who were posted
in a conspicuous place, and probably drew the conclusion that the colony was defended by armed troops. It was ascertained that three Arabs were killed by rifle fire. None of the colonists were injured. The Arabs carried no firearms, so far as the evidence goes, and none had entered the village.

Certain Arab notables were tried for incitement in connection with this affair, but there was no conviction. The District Commandant of Police and his men arrested 17 Arabs for participating in the raid. When Mr. Wainwright gave his evidence before us on the 23rd July, these had been released on bail, and had not yet been tried.

The raid on Khedera, which was in many respects a more serious affair, took place on the same day, and has been fully described in an interim report. There were no further attacks on Jewish agricultural colonies.

PART II.—CONCLUSIONS.

GENERAL.

When we come to consider the causes of these disturbances we find an immediate cause, which of itself could not have been sufficient to give rise to more than a street riot of the ordinary kind, confined to a comparatively small body of persons, restricted to a limited area, and within the power of the Jaffa police to control. That cause was the M.P.S. demonstration, and its clash with the procession of the Jewish Labour Party.

But this was no ordinary riot. The disturbance raged for several days with intensity wherever Arabs came into contact with Jews, and spread into the surrounding country, where Jewish colonies, having nothing whatever to do with Bolshevism, were attacked with ferocity. The Bolshevik demonstration was the spark that set alight the explosive discontent of the Arabs, and precipitated an outbreak which developed into an Arab-Jewish feud.

It has been said to us by Jewish witnesses that there was no essentially anti-Jewish question at that time, but that a movement against the Jews was engineered by persons who, anxious to discredit the British Government, promoted discontent and disturbance of the peace by stirring up the common people against the Jews. It is argued by them that all the trouble is due to the propaganda of a small class whose members regret the departure of the old régime, because British administration has put an end to privileges and opportunities of profit formerly enjoyed by them; that in co-operation with them are certain foreigners, principally French agents, who are ready to make mischief for political reasons, and to encourage any sort of disturbance calculated to embarrass the British Government. These witnesses asseverate that Zionism has nothing to do with the anti-Jewish feeling manifested in the Jaffa disturbances. They declare that the Arabs are only anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish because they are primarily anti-British, and that they are merely making use of the anti-Zionist cry in order to wreck the British Mandate.
We are satisfied that this is not the case. Although an inclination
to take advantage of any trouble in the country may have been present
in the minds of a very few for this and that reason, yet the feeling
against the Jews was too genuine, too widespread and too intense to
be accounted for in the above superficial manner. That there is
discontent with the Government has appeared during this inquiry, but
we are persuaded that it is due partly to the Government policy with
regard to a Jewish National Home in Palestine, partly to Arab mis-
understandings of that policy, and partly to the manner in which that
policy is interpreted and sought to be applied by some of its advocates
outside the Government. It culminates in a suspicion that the Govern-
ment is under Zionist influence, and is therefore led to favour a minority
to the prejudice of the vast majority of the population. We have been
assured, and we believe, that had there been no Jewish question, the
Government would have had no political difficulty of any importance
to deal with so far as its domestic affairs are concerned. We consider
that any anti-British feeling on the part of the Arabs that may have
arisen in the country originates in their association of the Government
with the furtherance of the policy of Zionism.

That the disturbance of the peace in Jaffa was in the first instance
provoked by the demonstration of the M.P.S., and that there had been a
conflict arising therefrom before the Arabs joined in, has been fully
stated in the narrative portion of this report. It is our opinion that,
taking into consideration the strained condition of Arab feeling, it was
unwise to risk trouble by allowing a generally detested, although
numerically small body of Communists to carry on any sort of propa-
ganda among this already uneasy population. No one wanted them,
and now that the danger has been realised the most notorious have been
depor ted.

Had there been nothing more than some rough handling of the
demonstrators by the Arabs, there would be little for us to say. It
would have been the usual row to which we are accustomed from time
to time in all countries. But we have no doubt that the Arabs were the
first to turn this quarrel into a race conflict, and, when once this issue
was joined, they behaved with a savagery which cannot be condoned.

Dr. Beadles, the Principal Medical Officer, Jaffa, thus speaks of his
examination of the dead bodies on the 1st May:

"I was struck most with the number of wounds on each body,
and the ferocity of the wounds. I am speaking particu-
larly of broken skulls. Some of the victims had dozens
of wounds."

The last expression may be an unconscious exaggeration, but it shows
the impression produced on the mind of a man who had practised his
profession during the war, and was not unaccustomed to the sight of
wounds. The killing was accompanied and followed by an orgy of
pillage which was a disgrace to a civilised community.

That the Jews retaliated with equal savagery is not to be denied,
but they had much to revenge.

There were two stories of mutilation, one on each side, but they were
not supported by any evidence, and we do not believe them. Two
cases were established of injuries by corrosive acid inflicted during the Jaffa trouble. In one case a Jew was the victim, in the other case an Arab.

We are convinced that the charge constantly brought by Jews against the Arabs, that this outbreak had been planned by them, or by their leaders, and was pre-arranged for the 1st May, is unfounded. It appears in evidence that on more than one occasion Arabs in European dress incited the crowd; but the notables on both sides, whatever their feelings may have been, were always ready to help the authorities in the restoration of order, and we think that without their assistance the outbreak would have resulted in even worse excesses. A good deal has been alleged by Jewish witnesses about the instigation of the Arab mob to violence by their leaders. If this means no more than that while educated people talk and write, the mob acts, then there is truth in the allegation. But if it means that had it not been for incitement by the notables, effendis and sheikhs, there would have been no riots, the allegation cannot be substantiated. To some extent the motives that influenced different sections of the Arab population were not the same; but the general belief that the aims of the Zionists and Jewish immigration are a danger to the national and material interests of Arabs in Palestine is well nigh universal amongst the Arabs, and is not confined to any particular class. All that can truly be said in favour of the Jewish view is that the leaders of Arab opinion not only make no secret of what they think, but carry on a political campaign. In this campaign, however, the people participate with the leaders, because they feel that their political and material interests are identical. There is no evidence worth considering, to show that the outbreak was planned and organised. Had that been the case, we hesitate to conjecture what the consequences would have been.

It may also be recalled that the 1st May was the Orthodox Easter Day, and that on that morning Orthodox Christians were in their churches, and afterwards received the customary visits of ceremony of their Moslem friends. It was therefore an unlikely day for Moslems and Christians to have chosen for a popular rising.

When we come to consider the raids on the agricultural colonies we find the immediate cause to be the reports of Jews having killed Arabs in the Jaffa riots. They were all the outcome of the general rage against the Jews aroused by these reports. In some cases there were local causes which stimulated this feeling. The Khedera raid was immediately prompted by a false report of the imprisonment of Arab labourers. The raid on Rehoboth was the immediate result of a story about the Jews of that colony having attacked a neighbouring Arab village. There is no evidence to show the responsibility of any particular village for the raid on Rehoboth, but Mr. Miller and Mr. Wainwright think that the false report was concocted on that day by persons at Ramleh who wished to promote an attack on the Jews. It is, however, only fair to add that two notables, who were tried in this connection, were acquitted. In the Petach Tikvah case only the Abu Kishk tribe can clearly be saddled with responsibility. The Yahoudieh men never actually raided the colony. They would have
done so had they not been caught in time by the military, but they were stopped and soundly punished. There is no evidence to show by whom Kefr Saba and Ain Hai were raided. The raiders found no one to kill, but looted and destroyed. In none of these five cases can the conduct of the Arabs be excused or condoned. Most of the colonists had lived for years on quite friendly terms with their Arab neighbours, and had in many cases given them regular employment on a large scale. The bloodthirsty attacks on these peaceful settlements, which had been guilty of no provocation whatever, are among the worst features of the disturbances.

LOOTING.

As in most countries, the desire for loot appears to have asserted itself strongly immediately the position got out of hand.

Looting was carried out in Jaffa and Menshieh on an extensive scale on Sunday and Monday, the 1st and 2nd May, but the looters appear to have been restricted to the poorer and more ignorant elements of the community. The looters were almost exclusively Arabs, the victims almost exclusively Jews.

The areas that suffered most were the Suk el-Deir and the Ajami quarters, where well-stocked shops were forcibly entered and stripped of their contents.

Men, women and children were to be seen pillaging and making off with goods of every description. Residential quarters suffered to a lesser extent.

On the 5th May the Government appointed a Looting Committee to

(i) Inquire into the nature and extent of pillage.
(ii) Inspect looted premises.
(iii) Collect information which might lead to prosecutions, and to the recovery of looted property.

The Committee was presided over by Mr. A. B. C. Gibson, who was assisted by a Moslem and a Jewish member. With a view to recovering as much as possible of the looted property the Committee intimated that persons returning loot to the Governorate by the 9th May would not be prosecuted in respect of goods so returned. The response was, however, small and practically nothing of value was returned. 479 claims were submitted in respect of loss by pillage, but the Looting Committee is unable to give any indication of the amount of damage suffered by the claimants.

A system of searches was instituted but failed to disclose the whereabouts of any of the stolen property, which had presumably been buried or secreted in the villages.

During and immediately after the riots complaints were constantly being received that soldiers under the guidance of Jews were searching houses. This was strongly resented, especially in houses where there were Moslem women, and orders were at once issued that soldiers were not to search houses without authority. It is, indeed, doubtful if soldiers at any time made such searches, and it is probable that the
alleged soldiers were demobilised Jews who had put on their old uniforms because of the authority which these conferred.

The looting of and damage suffered by colonies was the subject of consideration by a special Committee appointed by the Government.

We understand that up to the present 25 convictions have been recorded in respect of looting in Jaffa.

THE GOVERNOR.

During the three days of the Jaffa riots the Governor of Jaffa, Colonel Stirling, had a most difficult task to fulfil. After May Day the military were in occupation of Jaffa, although martial law was not declared until Tuesday. But the position on May Day was an impossible one. The Civil Administration had broken down under the pressure of popular violence. Looking back on the events, we realise that such an outbreak was liable to occur at any moment; but at the time it was totally unexpected, and all Palestine was taken by surprise. It was mainly owing to insufficiency of training, service and traditions, that the police were not of the quality required to withstand the crush of racial strife, and in some cases were not even willing to do so. Colonel Stirling was not responsible for that. We are of opinion that he did all he could have been expected to do in the circumstances.

THE POLICE.

The budget strength of the Police Detachment for the Administrative District of Jaffa is 10 officers, 53 mounted police, and 135 foot. The actual distribution in the sub-districts at the time of the disturbances was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Mounted men</th>
<th>Foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramleh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkeram</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two of the officers were British, five officers and 141 men Moslems, two officers and 19 men Christians, one officer and 21 men Jews.

The men are enlisted for only two years, a period which hardly enables them to acquire the degree of training and discipline necessary to subordinate those racial and religious prejudices which are so pronounced in Palestine, to the sense of duty. The absence of barrack life, too, is not conducive to discipline or to the growth of esprit de corps. Nor are the pay and conditions of service such as to attract the type of recruit, whose early environment and education fit him for the ready conception of those principles of impartiality which can alone make an efficient policeman, and invest him with the public confidence. It is stated by witnesses of all communities that, owing to unfavourable conditions of enlistment, recruits for the police force are
drawn from among those who are unable to find employment in other avocations. We are, however, persuaded that, with reasonable conditions, ample training, and a sufficiently long period of enlistment, the Palestinian offers good material for the creation of an efficient Force. This is indicated by the exemplary conduct of those officers and other ranks of the Force, who arrived from Jerusalem under the command of Major Montefiore. They were picked men, and had undergone a special course of training at the Police School in Jerusalem. We feel that it would be an act of prudence, well worth the expense, to secure the services of a number of experienced British constables or N.C.Os. to leaven the force, and to inculcate that spirit of duty and loyalty which is absent at present owing to lack of good traditions.

At the time of the outbreak of the riots, Mr. Wainwright, the District Commandant of Police, was absent at Khan Yunis, a coastal village in the Gaza district, 66 miles from Jaffa, whither he had proceeded on the morning of Saturday, the 30th April. There was no telephone at Khan Yunis, and Mr. Wainwright, on hearing of the disturbances, was only able to return to Jaffa by Tuesday, the 3rd May. There was, in our opinion, insufficient justification for his absence. Considerations of prudence demanded that he should have remained at his post. The Governor, who was away on District inspection on Friday, states that had he been present he would not have permitted Mr. Wainwright to leave the district.

Mr. Wainwright in his own evidence admits that he informed the acting Assistant Governor that he thought there would be a fight, but it does not seem to have occurred to him that there was any danger of it developing into a general disturbance. Fears were, however, entertained by other officers of the Force as to probabilities of conflict between the Labour demonstration and the M.P.S., and, as has been related, dispositions were worked out with a view to distributing the police at points at which they would be most effective. In applying by telephone to his headquarters for permission to leave the district, Mr. Wainwright appears not to have told the Deputy Director of Public Security, with whom he was speaking, of these fears. His failure to invite his Director’s attention to the fact that a Labour demonstration would be held during his absence was a serious omission.

We were informed by British Reserve Inspector Atkins that he is responsible for the custody and issue of police arms and ammunition and other stores. The storeroom is merely a portion of the police office, partitioned off with a curtain of blankets. Several police clerks work in this room, and it is, presumably, open to those members of the Force or public who have business with the police office. It seems to us a singularly lax arrangement to keep such important things as armoury stores in a place of this sort. According to Mr. Atkins, only 15 rounds of ammunition were issued on the Sunday, and of these five rounds were issued to each of three policemen. The police had other ammunition, which ought not to have been in their possession, and some of this excess ammunition was without doubt improperly used. Its possession may be attributed to the lack of an efficient system of checking the return of armoury stores issued for guards, patrols, field firing, or
other special duties. The evidence of Sergeant Beer and Privates Singer and Klevitsky, though to be accepted with reserve, indicates a carelessness that is almost alarming.

Of the Palestinian Police Officers, Mr. Cohen and Tewfik Bey did reasonably well. Of the others it is difficult to say more than that, although they lost control of the situation, they cannot be associated with the lawlessness and violence which characterised the behaviour of numbers of their subordinates. In this connection it is important to remember that during Sunday and part of Monday the force was without the leadership of a senior British officer. Undoubtedly Abdin Bey, the Assistant District Commandant, had a heavier burden thrown upon him than he could in fairness be expected to carry. Nevertheless, we feel that he committed a serious error of judgment in leaving the Immigration House when the attack there had begun, and in remaining away as long as he did.

There is one officer, however, namely, Second Inspector Hanna Effendi Bordcosh, who must incur more serious censure. The conduct of this officer has been referred to in an earlier portion of the report. He was at the Immigration House on Sunday when the trouble there was at its height. He saw and heard firing and bombs being thrown. He saw people being wounded, and an enraged and excited crowd, evidently intent on murder and plunder, battering in the door of the house. There were armed police present, and if Hanna Effendi had asserted his authority he might have done much to lessen the toll of the dead and wounded—42 in all—who were subsequently found in and about that house. Fully aware of the gravity of the situation, he returned to his home to have lunch, and to clean his belt of some blood, with which it had become bespattered, leaving the crowd to its own devices, and the inmates of the house to be the victims of the mob's violence. He showed himself utterly lacking in appreciation of his responsibility as a police officer, and of his authority as a uniformed Government official. It is difficult to conceive of a more flagrant disregard of duty.

The attitude of the other ranks of the Jaffa police throughout the riot was on the whole unsatisfactory. We cannot avoid the conclusion that racial considerations influenced their conduct, and that in the early stages of the trouble they became infected with partisanship, which rendered them not only ineffective as an instrument for the preservation of security, but resulted in some becoming active participants in violence and crime of a serious order. We have been unable to accept all the evidence tendered as to the conduct of the police, but convictions have been recorded against members of the Force on charges of homicide, theft, attempted rape and unlawful wounding, these offences being committed in the course of the disturbances. On the other hand it would have been surprising if this half-trained body of men had been able, in the interest of public duty, to stand out against the flood of racial passion which had been let loose.

We feel bound to add that, apart from their conduct during the riots, the Jaffa police made an unfavourable impression upon us through their lack of smartness, alertness, discipline, and policemanlike appear-
ance. During the two and a-half months we were sitting in Jaffa we had many opportunities to observe their demeanour, and although we noticed an improvement towards the end of this period, due, possibly, to the transfer of an inspector from the Jerusalem Detachment, we were unpleasantly affected by their prevailing slovenliness, a defect which one does not expect to find in a force under British command.

Causes of Arab Hostility to Jews.

So long as the Jews remained an unobtrusive minority, as they did under the Ottoman Government, they were not molested or disliked. It was only when it came to be believed by the Arabs that the Jews were exercising a preponderating influence over the Government that a state of feeling arose which required but a minor provocation on the part of a small number of undesirable Jews to ignite an explosion of popular anger against Jews in general. This manifested itself in serious outrages, of which some of the best sort of Jews have been the victims.

It is not within our province to discuss Zionism but only such questions as are popularly supposed to be involved in Zionism, and have been put before us as causes of the discontent culminating in the riots. Whether the construction put by the Arabs or their leaders in opinion on certain statements of fact are reasonable, and whether the statements themselves are true or capable of explanation are questions not altogether relevant to this inquiry. What are relevant are the statements themselves, and the constructions put upon them, because they show how it comes about that the present state of public feeling is such that outrages committed by the more ignorant and passionate part of the population have been, if not justified, yet, to say the least, explained and condoned by those who are themselves opposed to acts of violence. Persons apparently representing all sections of the non-Jewish community have voluntarily come before us to explain why public feeling became inflamed against the Jews. Moslems, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Maronites and other Uniates, Anglicans have been represented by witnesses, who included priests of the above Christian bodies; and it has been impossible to avoid the conclusion that practically the whole of the non-Jewish population was united in hostility to the Jews. During the riots all discrimination on the part of the Arabs between different categories of Jews was obliterated. Old-established colonists and newly arrived immigrants, Chalukah Jews and Bolshevik Jews, Algerian Jews and Russian Jews, became merged in a single identity, and former friendships gave way before the enmity now felt towards all. On the 27th June, nearly two months after the first outbreak, two members of the Commission of Inquiry chanced to meet a band of decently dressed Arab children, whose average age could not have exceeded six or seven, marching in procession along the Ajami quarter, brandishing sticks and branches, and shouting the words, "We want to fight the Jews." The incident was small, perhaps, but not without significance, and it was noted by the members of the Commission who saw it that no attempt was made by several policemen present to interfere with it in any way. So long as
the popular feeling described above continues it will not be possible to maintain law and justice effectively, because the mass of the people cannot be trusted to do justice where a Jew is concerned.

The grievances put before us by Arabs and others as having contributed materially to the state of exasperation which found its outlet in the disturbances are already known to the readers of the newspapers, but their repetition cannot be avoided in this report. We are satisfied that these grievances had the effect thus alleged, but this conclusion involves no pronouncement on our part upon their individual merits or demerits. The principal ones are contained in the following allegations:

(a) That Great Britain, when she took over the administration of Palestine, was led by the Zionists to adopt a policy mainly directed towards the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, and not to the equal benefit of all Palestinians.

(b) That in pursuance of this policy the Government of Palestine has, as its official advisory body, a Zionist Commission, bound by its ideals and its conception of its rôle to regard Jewish interests before all others, and constituted by its singular prerogatives into an imperium in imperio.

(c) That there is an undue proportion of Jews in the Government service.

(d) That a part of the programme of the Zionists is the flooding of Palestine with a people which possesses greater commercial and organising ability than the Arabs, and will eventually obtain the upper hand over the rest of the population.

(e) That the immigrants are an economic danger to the population because of their competition, and because they are favoured in this competition.

(f) That immigrant Jews offend by their arrogance and by their contempt of Arab social prejudices.

(g) That owing to insufficient precautions immigrants of Bolshevik tendencies have been allowed to enter the country, and that these persons have endeavoured to introduce social strife and economic unrest into Palestine and to propagate Bolshevik doctrines.

Labouring under these grievances the Arabs have regarded with suspicion measures taken by the Government with the best intentions. The Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920, which requires that the consent of the Government must be obtained to all dispossessions of immovable property and forbids transfers to others than residents in Palestine, they regard as having been introduced to keep down the price of land, and to throw land which is in the market into the hands of the Jews at a low price. The temporary measure, now inoperative, which prohibited the export of cereals, was enacted, as they contend, to oppress the native landowners so as to compel them to sell their land, and at the same time to provide cheap food for the Jewish immigrants.
In connection with their grievance against the disproportionate number of Jews in the Government the Arabs urge that the Legal Secretary is a Jew well known as an ardent exponent of Zionism, and, while making no personal attack upon him, say that the control which he is able to exercise over the Courts of Law lessens their confidence in the administration of justice. They also point to the personnel of the Public Works Department. They assert that Jews are exclusive in business, that a Jewish tradesman will not buy from an Arab if the goods he wants can be obtained from a Jew, and they argue that a Jewish official who has the power to influence the granting of a Government contract will not let it go to anyone but a Jew if he can help it.

With regard to the workmen and labourers employed by the Public Works Department and on the railways, they complain that the employment of a large number of Jews out of all proportion to the Jewish population of the country has displaced Arab labour, and is a means of using public money for the support of the very immigrants whose introduction is viewed with alarm and hostility. They say that they are made to pay for the Jewish National Home.

This brings us to the question of Jewish immigration. The objections on the part of the artisans and labourers are mostly economic. If the new arrivals could have been taken at once into agricultural colonies their coming would have had little effect on the working people of Jaffa; but their employment on public works and railways, and their entry into competition with the town people as artisans, labourers and porters, particularly since they have come in relatively large numbers, has aroused the same feeling of hostility and alarm that alien immigration has excited in other communities with which we are familiar. It would be useless to argue with the Arab that they are not aliens because they are returning to their ancient home, since this is to him the aspect of the Zionist question with which he will have nothing to do. He tells you that they are Russians and Poles, and sometimes adds that they are Bolsheviks. In any case he complains that they take the bread out of his mouth. The immigration policy has been likened to the bounty-fed commerce of the Germans, because the immigrant is subsidised in one way or another, and because, whereas the Arab has to starve when he is out of work the newcomer is believed to be provided for by the Government or subsidised by his own organisation.

Arabs who are not artisans or labourers repeat the above objections and add that immigrants compete in clerical occupations, especially now that Hebrew has been made an official language. Their main objection to immigration has, however, been political, and this objection, although originating with the more educated Arabs, has filtered through the khans and coffee-shops into the streets and villages. It can be summed up in the fear that through extensive Jewish immigration Palestine will become a Jewish dominion. This fear is not lessened when they read in Zionist literature such passages as the following, taken from the “Keren Ha-Yesod Book,” which will be referred to again later, “The object of the modern Jewish pioneer in Palestine is to prepare room and work for the thousands and millions that wait outside.”
A curious instance of the way in which men's minds work in regard to this question and the readiness with which the villagers take alarm at any movement which appears to threaten the existing relations between the races, is a notion which Mr. Reading, Sub-District Governor of Tulkarem, found current among villagers. It was this:—that the Jews when they had sufficiently increased in numbers would become so highly organised and so well armed as to be able to overcome the Arabs, and rule over and oppress them. There was probably a causal connection between this notion and a rumour current in the early days of May, that the Jews were being secretly armed by the Government. This rumour caused considerable unrest, and the Arabs were clamouring for arms. The influence of these notions and rumours should not be underestimated, for it must be borne in mind that in this part of the world racial and religious prejudices are elemental.

There is also a limited social objection to Jewish immigrants so far as Jaffa is concerned. Among the causes of the anti-Jewish irritation felt by the Arabs of Jaffa was a certain attitude of arrogance displayed in the streets and open places of the town by younger "Haluzim" of both sexes. Several witnesses have referred to the manner in which strings of these young men and women, in free and easy attire, would perambulate the streets arm in arm, singing songs, holding up traffic and generally conducting themselves in a manner at variance with Arab ideas of decorum. It is not difficult to understand the feelings inspiring these young people on their arrival in Palestine. It is natural that the transition from the cramping conditions under which they had been living in the countries whence they came to the freedom of their "National Home," the land of their dreams and hopes, should have stimulated an exuberance of spirit, probably combined with an exaggerated appreciation of what is implied by the term "National Home." On the other hand it is natural that Arabs should be irritated by the self-assertion and aggressiveness of these new arrivals, and that this pouring of new wine into old bottles should not proceed altogether easily. Our task in this inquiry is to establish facts rather than to impute blame; but the circumstance to which we refer shows how necessary it is that those responsible for the oversight of the immigrants should impress upon the latter the importance of directing their natural and legitimate enthusiasms into channels where they cannot offend others, and how necessary it is that they should warn them of the need to study the susceptibilities of their Arab fellow-citizens.

We have described the M.P.S. demonstration on the 1st May as a "minor provocation," and its relation to the disturbances as that of a spark igniting explosive material. Nevertheless, we feel that there may have been a tendency to underrate, perhaps on account of their small numbers and the fact that these numbers decreased after November, 1920, the danger to be apprehended from the Bolshevik Jews in Palestine, of whom most, but not all, were recent immigrants. The Bolshevik element in the country produced an effect out of proportion with its numbers, not by the success of its propaganda but by the genuine uneasiness it inspired in the Arabs, more particularly
in those of the poorer classes in the country districts. Of this unfeigned uneasiness we had ample evidence in the course of the Khedera inquiry, and it was a serious matter. It was a circumstance which conferred upon this handful of agitators an importance that cannot be measured by their exiguous intrinsic numbers, or by their failure to capture the Jewish Labour movement in the country.

We consider that the Arabs had a real fear of the Bolshevik element and of its propaganda, a fear which became acute with the less enlightened. How far that fear was justified it is impossible to say; the extent of the danger to be apprehended from these people cannot in the nature of things be accurately assessed. The case is different from that of the villagers of the Tulkeram neighbourhood, who were led to attack Khedera owing to their belief in a preposterous and baseless story of the detention of Arab labourers by the colonists. There was, as we pointed out in our report on the Khedera incident, no justification for believing, however genuinely, a rumour which could easily have been ascertained to be without foundation. With regard to the Bolsheviks, however, it was not possible for the Arabs positively to establish whether propaganda of the nature indulged in by the M.P.S. was likely to result in serious danger to the country or not; but the indications were such as to fill them with reasonable apprehensions on the subject. They saw that the M.P.S. activities were resulting in the beginnings of industrial strife, previously unknown in the country; they saw strikes and labour demonstrations, which filled their conservative minds with alarm; they read leaflets distributed by the M.P.S., in which the people were invited to participate in class war, and to promote anarchy and social upheaval. Such phenomena were sufficient, in our opinion, to cause uneasiness in the minds of the Arabs, and did, in point of fact, cause such uneasiness among them. Non-Bolshevik Jewish Labour organisations also indulged in strikes and other similar activities familiar enough in Europe, but new to Jaffa; and thereby served to create in the minds of the Arabs a feeling of dislike and distrust of Jewish labourer immigrants generally.

But for the considerations set forth above we feel convinced that there would be no animosity towards the Jews as such; that there is no inherent anti-Semitism in the country, racial or religious. We are credibly assured by educated Arabs that they would welcome the arrival of well-to-do and able Jews who could help to develop the country to the advantage of all sections of the community. Zionists, for their part, dwell freely on the theme that the realisation of the policy of the "National Home" will benefit Arabs as well as Jews; but we feel bound to express the opinion, arrived at in the course of the inquiry, that the Zionist Commission, which is the representative of the Zionist Organisation in Palestine, has failed to carry conviction to the Arabs on this point. So far as we can judge, the only sentiment it has inspired in them is one of profound distrust.

This distrust is not of recent growth, but appears first to have taken root in the early days of the Military Administration. At this time, according to evidence brought before us, Jews enjoyed greater facilities
than Arabs in the matter of obtaining permits to travel on and to import merchandise by military railways, owing to the fact that the Zionist Commission was accepted by the Administration as sponsor for the Jews, whereas the Arabs had no corresponding body to whom they could apply for guarantees for this purpose. Consequently the Jews were able to obtain their permits promptly, while the Arabs had to follow a cumbersome and lengthy procedure. This inequality of treatment was clearly not the fault of the Zionist Commission, and was probably inevitable at the time, but it created ill-will on the part of the Arabs towards the Commission. The subsequent activities and pretensions of the Commission do not seem to have dispelled or mitigated this ill-will, and if we refer to the topic here it is because the distrust inspired in the Arabs by the Zionist Commission has been, in our opinion, an appreciable factor in creating the feeling, but for which the Jaffa outrages would probably not have taken place. It seems to us that the Zionist Commission was in a better position than any other unofficial body or organisation to fulfil the important function of conciliating the Arabs, and of rendering, or attempting to render, the policy embodied in the Balfour Declaration acceptable to them. Such a function would require tact and powers of conciliation of a high order, and we feel that a part of the energies of the Zionist Commission could have been devoted to no more appropriate, more valuable, and more vital purpose. We find, however, a belief among the Arabs that the Commission has either desired to ignore them as a factor to be taken into serious consideration, or else has combated their interests to the advantage of the Jews. An unfortunate impression was created in the country by the practice of the Zionist Commission, abandoned since April, 1920, of paying subsidies to Jewish policemen and Jewish Government clerks of junior grades in aid of their official salaries. Again, we have had evidence to the effect that the Zionist Commission put strong pressure upon a large Jewish landowner of Richon-le-Zion to employ Jewish labour in place of the Arabs who had been employed on his farm since he was a boy. The farmer, we were told, yielded to this pressure with reluctance, firstly, because the substitution of Jewish for Arab labour would alienate the Arabs, secondly, because the pay demanded by the Jewish labourers, and the short hours during which they would consent to work, would make it impossible for him to run his farm at a profit.

Furthermore the influence exercised, or believed to be exercised, by the Commission over the framing of legislation, and in the selection of Government officials (also, occasionally, in the reinstatement of officials dismissed by the Government), has done nothing to lessen the distrust with which it is regarded by the Arabs, who have no similar body to exercise corresponding influence on their behalf. It is not for us to say that the activities, real or alleged, of the Zionist Commission were or are illegitimate; we can, however, say that in our opinion the Commission's conception of its duties and functions has exercised an exacerbating rather than a conciliatory influence on the Arab population of Palestine, and has thus been a contributory cause of the disturbances which are the subject of our inquiry.
It is important that it should be realised that what is written on the subject of Zionism by Zionists and their sympathisers in Europe is read and discussed by Palestinian Arabs, not only in the towns but in country districts. Thus a witness from Tulkeram, who appeared before us in the course of the Khedera inquiry, quoted as an instance of provocative writing the following passage from a book entitled "England and Palestine," by H. Sidebotham* :—

"It is desired to encourage Jewish immigration by every means, and at the same time to discourage the immigration of Arabs. . . ."

The book from which this quotation was taken was published as far back as 1918; but our attention has been called to other not less provocative statements appearing in Zionist publications since the disturbances, whilst we were sitting. Thus the Jewish Chronicle, No. 2,720, of the 20th May, 1921, makes the following statement in the course of its leading article :—

"Hence the real key to the Palestine situation is to be found in giving to Jews as such, those rights and privileges in Palestine which shall enable Jews to make it as Jewish as England is English, or as Canada is Canadian. That is the only reasonable or, indeed, feasible meaning of a Jewish National Home, and it is impossible for Jews to construct it without being accorded a National status for Jews."

Again, Palestine, the official organ of the British Palestine Committee, in its issue of the 4th June, 1921, in discussing the question of Jewish immigration, describes Palestine as a "deserted, derelict land." This description hardly tallies with the fact that the density of the present population of Palestine, according to Zionist figures, is something like 75 to the square mile.† On the 14th May there appeared in The Times a letter from Mr. V. Jabotinsky, a member of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation, in which he urged that, in view of the Jaffa disturbances, Jews alone should have the privilege of military service in Palestine, Arabs being excluded from the right to bear arms. Generous allowance must be made for the natural and justifiable feeling of indignation aroused among Jews by the Arab aggression on their co-religionists in Jaffa, and in the colonies which were so wantonly attacked. On the other hand utterances such as those we have quoted have not made for a resumption of friendly relations between Jews and Arabs. About the same time there appeared the "Karen Ha-Yesod Book," a volume issued by the promoters of the "Palestine Foundation Fund." In the chapter of this book devoted to the political position, disappointment is expressed that "the most vital of all rights in similar cases—the right of the Zionist Organisation to exercise its influence, through legally secured channels, in the choice of suitable candidates for this all-important post" (sc. that of High Commissioner for Palestine) is not included in the draft Mandate.

† See page 24 of the "Keren Ha-Yesod Book."
Until the Commission came to examine Dr. Eder, acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission, they were unaware to what extent such expressions of opinion as those we have quoted above were authorised by responsible Zionists. Dr. Eder was a most enlightening witness. He was quite unaggressive in manner and free from any desire to push forward opinions which might be offensive to the Arabs. But when questioned on certain vital matters he was perfectly frank in expressing his view of the Zionist ideal. He gave no quarter to the view of the National Home as put forward by the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner. In his opinion there can only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the numbers of that race are sufficiently increased. He declined to admit the word "dominion," but chose "predominance." As acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission Dr. Eder presumably expresses in all points the official Zionist creed, if such there be, and his statements are, therefore, most important. There is no sophistry about Dr. Eder; he was quite clear that the Jews should, and the Arabs should not, have the right to bear arms, and he stated his belief that this discrimination would tend to improve Arab-Jewish relations. He considered that with regard to the appointment of the High Commissioner for Palestine the Zionist organisation should be allowed either to formulate objections to the selection of the British Government, or to submit a list of its own nominees for consideration. We do not comment upon his opinions because the discussion of the questions raised is not our concern, but it is relevant to our report to show that the acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission asserts on behalf of the Jews those claims which are at the root of the present unrest, and differ materially from the declared policy of the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner for Palestine. It is perhaps worth noting as an instance of the diversity of manner in which Jews and Arabs look upon the same questions, that, whereas Arab witnesses denounce the Government of Palestine as a Zionist Government, Dr. Eder stigmatises it as an Arab administration.

The attitude of responsible Zionists as revealed above is not negligible, as it is one of the irritant causes of the present discontent. It arises perhaps from a habit of regarding Palestine as "a deserted, derelict land," sparsely inhabited by a population without traditions of nationality, where political experiments may be launched without arousing local opposition. Such a conception is considerably at variance with the spirit of the authorised Zionist policy as defined in the declared intentions of the Secretary of State and the local Government.

Much, we feel, might be done to allay the existing hostility between the races if responsible persons on both sides could agree to discuss the questions arising between them in a reasonable spirit, on the basis that the Arabs should accept implicitly the declared policy of the Government on the subject of the Jewish National Home, and that the Zionist leaders should abandon and repudiate all pretensions that go beyond it. The immigrants should be made to understand that,
whatever their historical and religious claim, they are after all seeking a home in a country at present overwhelmingly Arab, and that it behoves them to adopt a considerate attitude towards the people among whom they must wish to live in peace and friendship. The Arab notables, on the other hand, should make it clear to the Arabs that in no case can they expect murder, violence and pillage to be condoned.

Concluding Observations.

It may be thought that the time and labour expended on the examination of witnesses has been out of all proportion with the result as disclosed in this report. We have been unwilling to check the flow of witnesses, preferring to give all persons who came forward to be heard an opportunity of speaking freely before us rather than leave any party under the impression that it had not had a fair chance of putting its claims before the Commission.

We cannot close this report without expressing the sense of our obligations to the Mayor and Municipal Council of Jaffa for their courtesy in placing a room at our disposal for the purpose of our sittings.

In conclusion, we desire to pay a warm tribute to the services of our Secretary, Mr. Bryant, whose competence in dealing with the volume of work entailed by the inquiry has been above all praise.

We subjoin, in the form of appendices—

(a) A résumé of our conclusions, drawn up for the convenience of the Government, but not to be regarded as an expression of our views except if read in conjunction with the context of the report.

(b) A plan of Jaffa.*

(c) A table of medical statistics covering the casualties inflicted in the course of the disturbances and dealt with by the medical authorities.

(d) A verbatim report† of the evidence with exhibits (to be submitted separately).

THOS. W. HAYCRAFT,
Chairman.

Members: H. C. LUKE.
J. N. STUBBS.

10th August, 1921.

* Not reproduced. † Not printed.
APPENDIX A.

Résumé.

The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents.

The immediate cause of the Jaffa riots on the 1st May was an unauthorised demonstration of Bolshevik Jews, followed by its clash with an authorised demonstration of the Jewish Labour Party.

The racial strife was begun by Arabs, and rapidly developed into a conflict of great violence between Arabs and Jews, in which the Arab majority, who were generally the aggressors, inflicted most of the casualties.

The outbreak was not premeditated or expected, nor was either side prepared for it; but the state of popular feeling made a conflict likely to occur on any provocation by any Jews.

The general body of Jews is opposed to Bolshevism, and was not responsible for the Bolshevik demonstration.

When the disturbance had once begun an already acute anti-Jewish feeling extended it into an anti-Jewish riot. A large part of the Moslem and Christian communities condoned it, although they did not encourage violence. While certain of the educated Arabs appear to have incited the mob, the notables on both sides, whatever their feelings may have been, aided the authorities to allay the trouble.

The police were, with few exceptions, half-trained and inefficient, in many cases indifferent, and in some cases leaders of or participators in violence.

The conduct of the military was admirable throughout.

The raids on five Jewish agricultural colonies arose from the excitement produced in the minds of the Arabs by reports of Arabs having been killed by Jews in Jaffa. In two cases unfounded stories of provocation were believed and acted upon without any effort being made to verify them.

In these raids there were few Jewish and many Arab casualties, chiefly on account of the intervention of the military.

This résumé is necessarily too condensed to be regarded as the expression of the conclusions of the Commission, except when read in conjunction with the report.
### APPENDIX B.

#### Medical Statistics.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Jews</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td>Jaffa</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 5</td>
<td>Petach Tikvah</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rehoboth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khedera</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>146</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

This gives a total of 95 killed—48 Arabs and 47 Jews—and 219 wounded, of whom 73 were Arabs and 146 Jews. Those mortally wounded are included under the head “killed.” These figures represent the casualties actually admitted to the various hospitals. In addition there were considerable numbers who were treated for less serious wounds at the various clinics and out-patients’ departments, of whom no precise records exist.

The Principal Medical Officer estimates the total number of casualties dealt with by the medical authorities at 385, of whom 95 were killed and 290 wounded. Further, it is known that the Abu Kishk tribe of Bedouin removed the dead bodies about of 20 of their followers from the outskirts of Petach Tikvah on 5th May.
No. 4.

The High Commissioner for Palestine to
The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
JERUSALEM,
25th August, 1921.

SIR,

I had the honour to transmit to you on the 8th of July the interim Report* of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in Jaffa and the neighbourhood, which dealt with the attack upon the Jewish Colony of Khedera, and on the 16th of August, 1921, I transmitted the final Report† of the Commission.

These Reports constitute a very thorough and impartial review of the unfortunate events which took place in Jaffa and the adjoining districts in the month of May, and I have no doubt that you will concur in the expression of appreciation of their work which I have conveyed to the Commissioners.

I desire to add some observations on certain passages in these Reports.

On page 10‡ of the final Report it is mentioned that criminal proceedings against the ringleaders of some disturbances that had taken place in Jaffa in November, 1920, were abandoned by order of the Government. This was due, not to any reluctance to press the prosecution against the persons concerned, but to the fact that it was considered that evidence could not be obtained sufficient to secure their conviction by the Court.

On page 42§ it is mentioned that constant complaints were made by the Arabs of Jews being dressed as British soldiers. As soon as this was brought to my knowledge by the Military Authorities I issued a Public Notice, as follows:—

"Notice is hereby given that any person who, by wearing a British Military Uniform without authority, holds himself out as an officer or a soldier of the Army, is liable under Article 131 of the Ottoman Penal Code to imprisonment up to one year."

Page 66||.—The legal authorities have investigated a large number of complaints by the inhabitants of Yāhudieh, in which the complainants allege that they were attacked by the inhabitants of Petach Tikvah. These complaints are those which the Commission described as "in the main undoubtedly false." The legal authorities, in their independent investigation, have come to the same conclusion. Two charges have emerged, however, on which the accused will shortly be brought to trial—one on a charge of shooting at the wounded, the other on a charge of having thrown vitriol on the wounded.¶

Page 67||.—Reference is made to the case of Sheikh Abu Kishk in connection with the attack upon Petach Tikvah, which, at the time of

* No. 2. † No. 3. ‡ See p. 20. § See p. 32. || See p. 41. ¶ These charges were dismissed.
drafting of the Report, was still under consideration. This Sheikh was subsequently sentenced by the Military Court to 15 years penal servitude, which was reduced by the General Officer Commanding the troops in Palestine to 10 years, on account of the youthfulness of the accused. This sentence is now being served.

Page 71*.—The charges against the men arrested for participation in the attack on Rehoboth have been framed and the accused will shortly be brought to trial.†

On page 85§ and the subsequent pages, the Commissioners comment upon the standard of discipline of the Palestine police, and make certain suggestions.

The following measures have already been taken with a view to the improvement of the force:

(a) A training school was established on 1st February, 1921, and parties of 50 men receive an intensive training in police duties during a period of eleven weeks. The Commissioners testify (on page 86§) to the "exemplary conduct" of the men who were sent from this school to Jaffa at the time of the disturbances, shortly before the completion of their training.

(b) Barrack accommodation is being provided in the towns of Palestine as rapidly as funds allow, with a view to the police being no longer scattered in houses in the towns to which they belong. It will improve the discipline of the force when the men no longer live with their families when employed in the same town.

(c) The pay of the Palestinian Police Officers has been considerably increased. That the present rate of pay of the rank and file does not prevent satisfactory recruits being obtained is shown by the encomium passed by the Commissioners upon the men from the Training School, already quoted.

(d) A Reserve Force of Gendarmerie is now being recruited and trained, which will number 500 men, will be fully staffed with British Officers, will be trained with British military units, and will be employed in parties of not less than 25 men in the prevention of raids and the suppression of disorders. These men will be subjected to a strict discipline, and will be paid at higher rates than the ordinary police.

Page 90||.—Proceedings against Second Inspector Hanna Eff. Borda-cosh have not yet been completed.

Page 97||.—With regard to the reference to the Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920, the purpose of the restrictions referred to in this paragraph of the Report is to prevent speculative companies purchasing large areas of land in Palestine and holding them back from use or development in expectation of a considerable increase in price as the prosperity of the country increases.

* See p. 41.
† One man received a sentence of two years' imprisonment for inciting, two received one year's imprisonment, and the remainder were acquitted.
‡ See p. 47.
§ See p. 48.
|| See p. 49.
†† See p. 51.
On the same page reference is made to the temporary prohibition, in 1920, of the export of cereals. This prohibition was the result of a careful inquiry by a Committee, consisting of the heads of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Customs and Revenue and Treasury, under the chairmanship of the Civil Secretary, which reported that there was a serious danger of shortage. The cost of living was at the time excessively high, and it was feared that the export of the foodstuffs produced in the country would not only prevent its fall, but possibly cause a further increase.

Similar prohibitions of export, but of a more extensive character, were in force in neighbouring countries—Egypt and Syria—and although they have been for some time removed in Palestine they are still continued in Syria.

Page 98*.—The personnel of the Public Works Department is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British</th>
<th>Palestinian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Jew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officials</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Officials</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, exceedingly few of the Moslems of Palestine have qualified as engineers, and although any of them possessing the necessary technical qualifications and personal character would gladly be employed by the Administration, suitable candidates have not been forthcoming.

Page 98*.—The system of placing Government contracts is by public tender. The call for tenders is advertised in the local press, and when the tenders are received they are adjudicated upon by the Central Tenders Board, which is constituted as follows:

President—Controller of Stores.
Members—Treasurer.

Director of Department of Commerce and Industry. The head of the Department concerned with tenders to be discussed.
(Or officials delegated by them.)

Local Tenders Boards have lately been established for dealing with contracts in the outlying districts.

Page 110†.—With respect to the complaint mentioned in the report that the Arabs have no body similar to the Zionist Commission to exercise influence on their behalf, a Consultative Committee of leading Christian and Moslem notables has been constituted, which will be in close and constant communication with the High Commissioner.

I have, &c.,

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

* See p. 52.
† See p. 55.
No. 5.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies to
The High Commissioner for Palestine.

Downing Street,
21st September, 1921.

Sir,—

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches (1) of the 8th July,* transmitting a copy of a report† on the events which occurred in the Tulkeram district and dealing with the attack on the Jewish Colony of Khedera; (2) of the 16th August,* enclosing the final report‡ of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances at Jaffa; and (3) of the 25th August,§ in which you make certain observations on various passages in these reports.

2. I note the steps referred to in your last-mentioned despatch, which have been and are being taken with a view to the improvement of the Palestine Police Force in respect of training, accommodation, pay, and the improvement of the Reserve Force of Gendarmerie. The testimony of the Commissioners to the behaviour of the men sent from the training school at Jaffa at the time of the disturbances is a matter of much satisfaction. These measures have my approval, as has also the institution of proceedings against Second-Inspector Bordcosh.

3. The reports are most ably compiled and are lucid and well reasoned. I consider that the publication in Palestine of their impartial conclusions can only do good, and I accordingly telegraphed to you on the 16th September authorising their publication and notifying you that the reports, together with the terms of reference and your explanatory despatch,§ would be published in this country as a Command paper. The addenda referred to in your telegram of the 9th September* have been noted.

4. The reports make clear the necessity of revision, in the light of the lessons learnt in the course of the outbreak, of some of the rules for police and military action in the event of any similar disturbances arising in future, and I should be glad to learn in due course your views on the steps that remain to be taken towards this end.

I have, &c.,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

* Not printed. † No. 2. ‡ No. 3. § No. 4.