By Mike Scott-Baumann
The Report of the Palin Commission (or Court) of Inquiry, 1920
The Commission was established in May, 1920, to examine the reasons for the Jerusalem [âNebi Musaâ] riots of April, 1920, and âthe extent and causes of racial feelings that at present exist in Palestineâ. Its three members were all senior military officers.
The Commissionâs Report is clear, logically ordered and at pains to examine the views of all the main parties: the Zionists, the Arabs (both Muslim and Christian) and the British Administration. The Commission sat for 52 days and examined 152 witnesses.
The British Administration referred to throughout the report is the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) which had been established in April 1918.
The report starts with âthe more remote causesâ, examining both the âArab Caseâ and the âJewish Caseâ, on the grounds that this will lead on to âthe gradual unfoldingâ of events which led to the riots.
âThe Arab Caseâ
The report notes that âTurkishâ [not âOttomanâ] rule had not been onerous, that it had been carried out âthrough the leading Arab familiesâ and that the âthree sectsâ (Muslim, Christian and Jew) lived in âamityâ.
The Commission endorsed the official British view that Palestine was not one of the areas which Sir Henry Mc Mahon, High Commissioner of Egypt, in 1916, had acknowledged should be independent after the end of the First World War but it notes that the Arabs were encouraged by the Alliesâ declared policy of self-determination for âsmall nationsâ. Nevertheless, the Balfour Declaration was âundoubtedly the starting point of the whole trouble.â In particular, the vagueness of âA National Home for the Jewish Peopleâ had led to âloose interpretationsâ and âoutspoken statements of the Zionist extremistsâ.
The Commission believes the Declaration led to the âbitterness of the awakeningâ amongst the Arabs and to hostility towards the British Administration. The Arabs had âa deep-seated fear of the Jewâ and of âthe Jew as a rulerâ [British officials frequently spoke of âJewsâ when they were referring to Zionists]. The Arabsâ greatest fear was of economic competition, of âextensive Jewish immigrationâ backed by the âphysical force of a great Imperial Powerâ. The Arab farmer was filled âwith panic fearâ, believing that âroom can only be made for the Jew in their country by their own subjection or evictionâ.
The reportâs authors believe that whatever the âcarrying capacityâ of the land (whether there is sufficient undeveloped arable land to sustain Jewish settlement on the land), âall immigration should be carefully regulated and admitted very graduallyâ. Yet Arabs see it as ineffectively controlled.
The Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann is seen as a moderating influence but the âloose language of the Jewish extremistsâ, who talk of expelling Arabs and placing them in a âposition inferior to that of the Jewsâ, and Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, referring to a âJewish Stateâ, â has led to panicâ.
The reportâs authors highlight the pressure which the Zionist organisation exerted on the Government in London, particularly evident in the terms of reference granted to the Zionist Commission, which was to advise the British authorities in Palestine âin all matters relating to Jews or which may effect the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish peopleâ. The Commission, which arrived in Palestine in April, 1918, went on to secure recognition of Hebrew as an official language and the agreement that all Jewish candidates for police be assessed by the Commission which, in turn, led to âdivided loyaltyâ especially as the Administration allowed the Commission to subsidise all Jewish officials in the police and elsewhere.
The Zionist Commission was reported to be looking like an âindependent administrationâ which duplicated âevery departmentâ of official administration and exploited channels that enabled it to learn of âthe most secret [British] official documentsâ, all this âat a time when the Mandate has not yet been given.â
While some of the demands of the Zionists were rejected (e.g. for more participation in the Military Administration), all show pressure on the Government in London and a Zionist attitude towards the Administration of âWe want the Jewish State and we wonât waitâ. The Zionists were reported to be determined to âforce the hand of an Administration bound to respect the âStatus Quoâ and to commit it, and thereby future Administrations, to a policy not contemplated in the Balfour Declarationâ.
The report says that Zionist intelligence knew âa great deal more of the inner working of the Administrationâ than vice versa and that the Zionist Commissionâs interference âconvincedâ Arabs of the power of the Commission and irritated those in the Administration who wished to govern in âthe best interests of allâ.
Zionist influence is reported to have led to the dismissal of the Arab Mayor of Jerusalem by the governor, Ronald Storrs, and the appointment of David Yellin, a Jew, as Deputy Mayor, so that Arabs viewed the Civil Administration as âthe mere puppet of the Zionist organisationâ.
The Court of Inquiry recognised that the ânative populationâ was supposed to have been reassured by the Balfour Declarationâs guarantees on civil and religious rights but that when Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, a Zionist elder and leader, stated that the âTemple area and the whole of the Mount are bound in the end to revert to usâ and the Zionist Commission referred to the Wall as âproperty of Israelâ and expressed confidence that âour Holy Temple will be rebuiltâ, doubts were increasingly entertained by both Arab public and British government officials.
In what is effectively an intermediate conclusion, the report found âthe native population, disappointed of their hopes, panic-stricken as to their future, exasperated beyond endurance by the aggressive attitude of the Zionists, and despairing of redress at the hands of an Administration which seems to them powerless before the Zionist organisation.â
For these reasons, the report found the Arabs prey to anti-British agitation, especially following the declaration, by Emir Feisal of âUnited Syriaâ, which included Palestine and which Muslim-Christian Associations supported as a way of foiling Zionist aspirations and countering the Balfour Declaration.
The Report then goes on to examine:
âThe Jewish caseâ
Zionist witnesses were reported to have been particularly bitter. They described the riots as a âpogromâ, if not because of the connivance of the Government then of âlower police officialsâ. Furthermore, they alleged that the Administration had displayed bias, shown disloyalty to the policy of the Balfour Declaration and been unprepared for the attacks of which they had been forewarned.
The report stresses the need to recognise that the Administration is âa military organisation acting under a Chief Administrator who takes orders from the Commander-in-Chiefâ, Lord Allenby. As such, the Chief Administrators always followed Military Law for occupied enemy territory, above all the requirement to maintain the Status Quo. However, this proved difficult because the military administration, which was meant to be transitory, lasted a âfew yearsâ owing to the âprotracted [post-war] peace negotiationsâ while Zionist pressure on the Foreign Office resulted in proclamations, such as that introducing the Hebrew language, which were clearly at variance with the Status Quo. The Zionists were abusing âtheir influence at home with the British government leading to âharassmentâ of the Administration in Palestine.
The report then turns to Zionist allegations of bias in the Administration, firstly in the form of personal comments by government personnel and unfair discrimination. However, it finds comparatively little evidence of such and the senior judicial officer, Lieutenant Norman Bentwich, who is Jewish and is said be an ardent Zionist, did not detect a general bias and thought the âJews are a little out to seek offenceâ. The evidence of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, recently the Chief Political Officer, who saw widespread British âdislike for the Jewâ, is given less credence as believed to be sweeping and contradictory. The report concludes that there had been only a couple of cases of unfair discrimination and that these had led to dismissals.
In response to Zionist accusations that the Administrationâs dealings with Emir Feisal indicated a disloyalty to the British Government and encouraged the Arabs to attack the Jews, the report acknowledges that the British did consider recognising Feisal asâ ruler of an Arab state including the English provinces of Mesopotamia and Palestineâ, as it might end French intrigue and pacify Arab states. However, it did not agree that this constituted âdisloyalty to the Government Policy or distaste for Zionist aimsâ but âa hopeful and possible solution of the grave difficulties which were then afflicting the near and middle East.â
The report points out âthe occasional failure of liaison between the OETA. and the Governate of Jerusalem and the defective intelligence system which resulted in their being ignorant of the Zionistsâ duplication of Governmentâ and of âthe daily drilling of âJabotinskyâs armyâ [see below] when that proceeding was the common talk of the townâ.
In conclusion, the Court recognised no general bias, only a few individual cases and in difficult circumstances, and that the Administration âloyally carried out the policy laid down for itâ, holding the balance between âthe warring sectionsâ.
âCircumstances which gave rise to the disturbancesâ
The Report judged that Arab hostility to the Zionists and to the British Administration contributed to a widespread feeling that a âstorm was beating upâ in the weeks before Easter.
The Administration allowed two demonstrations to go ahead before Easter (providing a âsafety valveâ) despite objections by Zionist leaders. The first was manageable, the second followed Faisalâs declaration of himself as âKing of Syria and Palestineâ and the temper was âdecidedly nastyâ and the speeches âviolently politicalâ, although the police maintained control.
In Easter week, Christian, Jewish and Muslim festivals all coincided. The Muslim festival of Nebi Musa involved a pilgrimage from Jerusalem to the tomb, believed by Muslims to be that of Moses, near Jericho. The report states that âsubsequent eventsâ suggested that âfirebrandsâ and âagents provocateursâ were present but that there was âno evidence of any definite plan on the part of an organised body of riotersâ.
Traditionally, the Turks had 2-3,000 troops on standby in case of clashes between the âwrangling sectsâ at this time. The British expected some âtroubleâ on the Friday before Easter when Muslim pilgrims from the ânearer villages and Jerusalem itselfâ assemble and process to the Haram al Sharif. However, only eight police officers and 188 men were available (âtotally inadequateâ in numbers and in training) and Allenby forbade the use of troops. In the event, the ceremony passed off peacefully, perhaps instilling a âfalse sense of security.â
Then, on the Sunday, after the arrival of pilgrims from Hebron, some highly political speeches were made and a portrait of the Emir Feisal elicited cries of âKing of Syria and Palestineâ. In the midst of a âhighly inflammatoryâ atmosphere, an explosion occurred, quite possibly âfired by some agents provocateurs raising the cry of an insult to the banner by a Jew.â This led to the stoning and looting of some Jewish shops and assaults on Jews. Although there were âsome incidents in which groups of Jews attacked the police and Arab lootersâ, the Jews were judged to be âthe sufferersâ, with âthe majority of the casualties being old men, women and children.â
Troops were brought in and âthe trouble appears to have been practically over by middayâ, but âno less than 118 casesâ were treated at one hospital alone.
The report, however, is clearly critical of the police for having âdrifted into a condition of helplessnessâ so that, by the Sunday, âthey had practically ceased to have any value as a force.â Furthermore, the failure to prosecute Arabs âarrested during the riots for offences and Arab policemen charged with misconductâ was âunsatisfactory.â
The Jews in Jerusalem were said to be in âcomplete panicâ while the Zionist Commission blamed the Administration for all their troubles. The Jews showed âa strong desire to assist, but in their own way and as usual to work under their own chiefs rather than assist the Administrationâ. On the Sunday, âMr. Jabotinsky and Mr. Ruthenberg [sic]â offered the assistance of their âvolunteer bandsâ. These had been âopenly drillingâ although the Administration claimed not to know, a fact attributed to âthe curious defects in the intelligence systemâ. They also asked for Arab police to be disarmed. Three days later Vladimir Jabotinsky was arrested and was prosecuted (he had arms in his house), a decision which the report found âungenerousâ, especially given his ârecord as the organiser of the Jewish Battalions for the service of the British Armyâ during the War.
Whatever plans were made for keeping order at this stage (and the Court reported a âconflict of evidenceâ from senior military officials), they did not prevent the murder of âseveralâ Jews and the looting of Jewish property on the Monday. The removal of troops from the centre of âthe walled cityâ that day was deemed to be âa very serious error of judgementâ.
On the Tuesday, the military were âin controlâ although one military witness reported that looting and shooting continued âin the absence of both police and soldiers.â Despite the imposition of martial law, the Court concluded that âit was undoubtedly too long a time before effective control was attained.â
âThe extent of racial feeling in Palestineâ
In a penultimate, short section, the report concludes: âIt is impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the position erected in Palestine by the various misunderstandings and indiscretions narrated in the foregoing report. On the one hand we are faced with a native population thoroughly exasperated by a sense of injustice and disappointed hopes, panic stricken as to their future and as to ninety per cent of their numbers in consequence bitterly hostile to the British AdministrationâŚ
On the other hand we have the Zionists, whose impatience to achieve their ultimate goal and indiscretion are largely responsible for this unhappy state of feeling, now bitterly hostile to the British Administration⌠They are ready to use their powerful foreign and home influence to force the hand of this or any future Administration. If not carefully checked they may easily precipitate a catastrophe, the end of which it is difficult to forecastâ.
In its âConclusionsâ, the Report lists âthe considered opinions submitted by the Courtâ in a 500-word summary. In its final words, it observes: âThat the situation at present obtaining in Palestine is exceedingly dangerous and demands firm and patient handling if a serious catastrophe is to be avoidedâ.
Postscript
In mid-April, Major-General Sir Louis Bols, the last military administrator, wrote to British military Headquarters in Cairo to recommend abolition of the Zionist Commission. It was impossible to please people, he wrote, âwho claim nothing more than a National Home but in reality will be satisfied with nothing less than a Jewish Stateâ. Sir Louisâs recommendation was ignored and the Zionist Commission was recognised as the official âJewish Agencyâ, mentioned in the Mandate, a year later.
The military administration was replaced by a civilian one in July, 1920, and Sir Herbert Samuel became High Commissioner. The report was presented in August, 1920. General Allenby advised that it should be published, partly to âclearâ the military, who were not âin any way to blameâ. However, in anticipation of Zionist objections, it was decided, on Sir Herbertâs advice, only to convey the gist of the report verbally to a âresponsibleâ Zionist leader. The contents were not made public.
A graduate of the University of Cambridge, Mike Scott-Baumann taught history for 35 years and is the author of Palestinians and Israelis: A Short History of Conflict which was published by The History Press in 2021. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the Balfour Project.